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Tax Treaty Aggressiveness: Who is Undermining Taxing Rights in Africa? 
 






Tax avoidance strategies by multinational companies rely heavily on tax treaties. Multinational 
companies can relocate financial activities across countries to ensure the applicability of the 
most beneficial tax treaties. This ‘treaty shopping’ can be particularly harmful to African 
countries, impairing their efforts for domestic resource mobilisation and achieving sustainable 
development goals. In this paper, we analyse the aggressiveness of tax treaties towards 
African countries – the extent to which signing tax treaties reduces the taxing rights of African 
governments. We find that treaties signed with France, Mauritius and the United Arab Emirates 
reduce withholding tax rates the most, while treaties signed with European countries – and, in 
particular, the United Kingdom and France – greatly limit other taxing rights, for example, by 
restricting the scope of permanent establishment definition.  
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The increase in international investment is a defining characteristic of economic globalisation. 
For over 90 years, tax treaties have played an integral part in this process, enabling the rise of 
the multinational firm. In 2016, the total inward stock of cross border foreign direct investment 
(FDI) amounted to US$28tn, while the associated intra-group trade amounted to an estimated 
annual US$6tn (Meinzer 2019). A large majority of this investment and trade – 82% and 90% 
respectively – is governed by tax treaties. Tax treaties divide the taxing rights over cross-border 
economic activity between two jurisdictions and are, thus, important determinants of tax 
revenues. As tax treaties rose in numbers to more than 3800 in 2019 (International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation n.d.), so have the disputes about their interpretation and application. 
The large number (Baistrocchi and Hearson 2017) and the stockpile of unresolved mutual 
agreement procedure cases (MAPs) bears witness to the distributive conflict and tax 
avoidance potential inherent in these treaties.  
 
The distributive conflict and tax avoidance risks arise most pronouncedly when treaty partners 
are economically diverse. For example, if one treaty partner is a high-income country with 
many resident multinational corporations (MNCs), while the other is a low-income country 
without many MNCs, but host to inward FDI and subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, any reciprocal 
provision in a treaty to constrain the taxing rights of source jurisdictions – i.e. where 
subsidiaries are located – amounts de facto to a unilateral, asymmetric loss of tax revenues 
borne almost exclusively by the lower-income source country. Tax treaties can thus be 
conceptualised both as building blocks of tax avoidance strategies for large MNCs and as an 
element in a mercantilist foreign economic policy strategy whereby domestic economic actors’ 
foreign activity is sought to be shielded from foreign taxes (Durst 2019; Hearson 2021; Wells 
and Lowell 2014). 
 
The academic literature on tax treaties has mainly focused on treaty shopping and negotiation 
dynamics (Hearson 2018; Mutava 2019), whilst some research has quantified revenue losses 
of individual treaties, countries or features of the treaty network (Balabushko, Beer, Loeprick 
and Vallada 2017; Janský and Šedivý 2019). However, the extent to which tax treaties reduce 
source taxing rights in lower-income countries has not been systematically analysed. We 
address this research gap in our paper by asking two interrelated questions: What countries 
are most aggressive in reducing taxing rights through tax treaties in Africa? How sensitive are 
the findings to different measures of treaty content and aggressiveness? We replicate and 
extend previous analyses of treaty aggressiveness for the Corporate Tax Haven Index (Tax 
Justice Network 2019a; Tax Justice Network 2021b) by incorporating a novel dataset 
(Hearson, Carreras and Custers 2021) developed at the International Centre for Tax and 
Development. These extensions of the model and diversification of data allow us to derive 
more nuanced and robust findings on the most aggressive treaty partners, highlighting the 
aggressive role of former colonial powers as well as new players. Our analysis of treaty 
aggressiveness rests on the following conceptualisation: an aggressive treaty is that which 
reduces source tax rights more acutely than other treaties in force in the source jurisdiction. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. In Section One, we position our contribution in the literature 
and introduce key concepts that determine the taxing rights in tax treaties. Section Two details 
the data sources and models employed in the analysis. Results of the different models and 






1 The role of tax treaties in international tax 
avoidance 
 
1.1 Distributing taxing rights with tax treaties 
 
Bilateral tax treaties (BTT) divide taxing rights over income arising from cross-border 
investment between two jurisdictions. The purpose of these treaties has traditionally been 
stated as preventing double taxation of the same income. If cross-border investment occurs in 
the absence of a treaty, the lack of coordination between tax rules of a pair of jurisdictions may 
result in overlapping taxing rights on the same income by both jurisdictions, resulting in so-
called double taxation.1  
 
Over the years, with concerns over tax avoidance rising on the policy agenda, clauses on 
preventing treaty abuse have been inserted into the model treaties of the OECD and the United 
Nations (OECD 2017; United Nations 2017). While both model treaties differ in how they 
attribute the tax base between jurisdictions, they are very similar in structure and shape almost 
all BTTs in force today (Lennard 2009).  
 
Vis-à-vis any investment, a jurisdiction can either be host to an inward investment sourcing 
profits (source country) or home of the investor (residence country) with an outward 
investment. Tax treaties prevent double taxation essentially by limiting the taxing rights of the 
source country. These limitations can be grouped into three types of provisions. The first type 
relates to the definition of the Permanent Establishment (PE; Article 5 of the UN and OECD 
model treaties). This is one of the main building blocks of a treaty since source taxation of 
business profits depends on whether or not the foreign company has a ‘permanent 
establishment’ in the country where income arises. Furthermore, even if the foreign company 
has a PE in the source country, some treaties only allow source taxation when income is 
directly ‘attributable’ to such a PE. The specifics of what constitutes a PE is thus of paramount 
importance for determining source taxing rights. While the UN model suggests a broad 
definition of PE, which allows companies engaging in economic activity in a jurisdiction to be 
more easily considered taxable, the OECD provides a range of exceptions applicable, for 
example, to stock and delivery companies, dependent agents, consultancy services, or 
insurance businesses.  
 
The second category of treaty limitations to source taxing rights pertains to withholding taxes 
(WHT). Treaties often impose upper limits on the tax rates a country can levy on outbound 
payments, such as dividends, interest and royalties, or management fees and technical service 
fees. A 0% WHT rate is the most disadvantageous to the source country since it cannot levy 
any WHT on outward cross border payments. For example, the OECD model tax convention 
sets for dividends a 5% or 15% rate (the lower rate applies to substantial holdings), for interest 
10% and for royalties 0%. In the UN model, no rates are set. These are left for negotiation 
between potential treaty partners. 
 
The third category of treaty limitations to source taxing rights comprises a set of diverse 
provisions. These provisions may alternatively protect or constrain the rights of the source 
 
1 Literature differentiates between legal and economic double taxation. Legal double taxation is when two different authorities 
impose tax on the same income. For example, a foreign business earns profits in a country, and both that country and the country 
where the business is incorporated charge tax on the same amount of income. Economic double taxation refers to situations 
where the same increase in capital is taxed at the level of two different taxpayers. That is the traditional framework resulting from 
limited liability considered legal entities: the state recognises that a company is an entity separate from its owner, and thus both 
the entity and the owner have to pay tax on income received (the entity is usually subject to corporate income tax, while the owner 
or shareholder pays tax when income is distributed as a dividend). We consider that economic double taxation is a constitutive 




country to tax capital gains from the sale of shares of a ‘land-rich’ company (a company whose 
value is more than 50% derived from domestic real estate), income from the disposal of shares 
of companies resident in the source country, or any other income arising in the country but not 
specifically covered in the treaty. Although not directly linked to PE or WHT, these and other 
characteristics can constitute a significant source of revenues or losses for source jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, vague definitions of ‘dividend’ and ‘interest’ within a bilateral treaty may give rise 
to hybrid mismatches of investment income, which may result in negative tax rates (BEPS 
Monitoring Group 2014).2 
 
The overall balance of the distribution of taxing rights in model tax treaties has been analysed 
by legal scholars. It is widely accepted that the most widely-followed OECD model treaty 
attributes most taxing rights to the capital-exporting country, i.e. the jurisdiction of residence of 
the investor (Daurer and Krever 2014; Figueroa 2005). Sol Picciotto found that the OECD 
model treaty gives ‘virtually all the exclusive rights to tax […] to the state of residence’ (Picciotto 
1992: 61). The question of the distributive impact of tax treaties has been analysed by legal 
scholars, not only by comparing treaty models or individual treaties but also by contrasting tax 
treaties to situations without any treaty. Notably, Dagan (2000) revisited the need for treaties 
to avoid double taxation and observes in a sample of treaties of ‘major developed countries’ 
that almost all of these offer unilateral treaty relief to prevent double taxation (Dagan 2000: 
979). She concluded that the common idea that treaties are necessary for alleviating double 
taxation is a ‘myth’, and that they instead serve ‘[…] much more cynical goals, particularly 
redistributing tax revenues from the poorer to the richer signatory countries’ (Dagan 2000: 
939).  
 
Dagan’s empirical claim about the widespread nature of unilateral treaty relief was 
corroborated recently through research covering 70 jurisdictions representing 86.5% of global 
foreign direct investment (Tax Justice Network 2021a). According to the Tax Justice Network’s 
findings, unilateral double taxation relief in the form of tax exemption or credit exists in the vast 
majority of cases. Over 89% of jurisdictions provide such relief for portfolio dividends, 94% for 
qualified dividends and 84% for interest and royalties. Although treaties may effectively ensure 
a fixed legal framework that provides tax certainty to businesses operating in two or more 
jurisdictions, or convenient to reduce multinationals’ overall tax liability, it is clear tax treaties 
are not necessary to avoid double taxation.3 Indeed, recent academic work has identified the 
reduction of multinationals’ foreign tax liability as the main function of tax treaties, akin to 
common tax incentives (Zolt 2018). Comparing tax treaties to unilateral tax incentives, Brooks 
and Krever (2015) concluded that the latter had significant advantages in terms of 
administrative capacity, flexibility in time and democratic governance. 
 
2 Assuming that a ‘dividend’ flow is subject to withholding tax in country A when paid to a parent company in country B. Hybrid 
treatment may occur when the flow is considered ‘interest’ in country A (deductible), potentially subject to no withholding tax, and 
then considered ‘dividend’ income in country B, where such income is tax-exempt. As a result, not only can hybrid treatment result 
in non-taxation of certain amount of income, but it can also result in having that amount considered deductible (interest), effectively 
lowering the tax paid on other income. 
 
3 It must be conceded, however, that unilateral provisions to avoid double taxation are not as effective at preventing double 
taxation as double tax treaties. For instance, there may be cases in which the rules determining the residency of taxpayers conflict 
between countries, leading to both claiming residence and full tax liability of one legal entity or taxpayer. Yet, for a number of 
reasons this argument is of limited relevance: a) these cases are the exception rather than the rule; and b) pure economic ‘single 
taxation’ is a theoretical concept derived from economic modelling that is only of limited value in reality. In many countries different 
types of taxes are levied on the same economic activity, for instance VAT is levied on the turnover of a company, then the profits 
stemming from the turnover are taxed through federal and state corporate income taxes and in a third stage, the investment 
income in form of dividends is again taxed when received by shareholders. No one would reasonably speak about ‘triple taxation’ 
in such a case. Similarly, it is dubious to speak about double taxation in a cross-border context. In the words of Sol Picciotto: 
‘double taxation is a dubious concept. Firstly, it does not mean companies’ tax bills doubling: it means that there may (rarely) be 
some overlap between states’ taxing claims (think of this in terms of the overlap in a Venn diagram). Any overlap may result in a 
modestly higher overall effective tax rate, not a ‘”double” rate’. (Picciotto 2013: 3). This ‘modestly higher overall effective tax rate’ 
(ibid) could be higher than the corporate tax rate of one particular country, but it may still be lower than another country’s corporate 
tax rate. If one called this situation double taxation, then this implies speaking about double taxation also in situations in which 
two unrelated companies operate in two different countries, with one country levying twice as high a corporate tax rate as the 
other country. This, of course, is misleading and reveals the dubious and theoretically flawed nature of the concept of double 





Beyond the direct impact of treaties on the distribution of taxing rights, tax treaties can have 
important indirect effects in the context of treaty shopping. Treaty shopping consists of 
restructuring the corporate group to access specific treaties or specific features of a treaty. 
This typically involves setting up intermediate legal entities (holding companies) in a jurisdiction 
that has signed an advantageous tax treaty with the target jurisdiction. As a result of this 
process, multinational corporations are structured as hundreds of separate entities 
purposefully assembled across multiple jurisdictions to channel any investment and associated 
payment through the least taxed avenue. 
 
Indirect treaty effects through treaty shopping exacerbate the direct distributional impact of tax 
treaties. Consider the treaty between France and Vietnam, signed in 1993. It sets the upper 
limit of the WHT rate for interest payments at 0%. On average, the other treaties signed by 
Vietnam set withholding tax rates of about 10% with respect to interest payments 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC 2021a). Thus, even if Vietnam wants to reduce dependence 
on foreign creditors by increasing its domestic withholding rates on interest, French lenders 
will still be able to earn interest without paying any withholding taxes, as long as the treaty is 
in force. This low rate benefits French banks and corporate investors rather than Vietnamese 
banks and lenders vis-à-vis French borrowers, given the asymmetries between both 
economies. Yet profits shifted from Vietnam through interest payments may not end up in 
France but could be shifted further to lower-tax countries like Switzerland, with which France 
has favourable treaties.  
 
Recently developed offshore financial centres like Mauritius have also been negotiating highly 
aggressive treaties, reducing the taxing rights of African countries. For example, domestic 
WHT rates in the Republic of Congo range between 15 and 20%, but Mauritius and Congo 
have signed a treaty limiting WHT rates to between 0% and 5% for all types of payments (IBFD 
2019b; 2020b). Yet, the aggressiveness of this treaty is not limited to WHT. The Republic of 
Congo is also prevented from taxing capital gains of Mauritius-resident companies with 
substantial real estate holdings in the Republic. Both provisions are examples of tax treaty 
aggressiveness, which the models discussed in the next section will formalise. The absence 
of an anti-abuse provision in the treaty also contributes to treaty shopping and tax avoidance 
risks emanating from this treaty. With these aggressive provisions, Mauritius reduces the 
taxing rights of the Republic of Congo and can be used in treaty shopping strategies by 
multinational corporations. 
 
Legal scholars have discussed the risks for tax avoidance emanating from treaties (Sheppard 
2013). A pervasive and complex problem involves applying transfer pricing rules in the 
attribution of profits within a corporate group across jurisdictions (Avi-Yonah, Clausing and 
Durst 2009; Durst 2010; Picciotto 2018). The transfer pricing guidelines by the OECD are 
referred to in the OECD’s model tax treaty (Picciotto 2018) and heavily influence the 
interpretation of treaty language for the attribution of profit across treaty partners.  
 
In recent years, legal scholars discussed the potential for treaty abuses in case studies of 
specific treaty combinations, for example leading to triple non-taxation (Li 2017). Mounting 
concerns about treaty-related tax avoidance, base erosion and profit shifting have been 
reflected in the OECD’s BEPS Action plan (BEPS Monitoring Group 2015; OECD 2015). In 
2017, this process culminated in the signature of the Multilateral Legal Instrument (MLI). It 
amends all those treaties that individual signatory countries have chosen with a view to 
reducing their potential for abuse (Brauner 2018; Tandon 2018). While the MLI has attempted 
to address issues, such as the artificial avoidance of PE status or hybrid mismatches between 
legal characterisation in two jurisdictions, the effectiveness of these provisions has been 





1.2 Tax treaties in economic development and international relations: the 
controversial FDI argument 
 
While some legal scholars have observed decreases in treaty rates fuelled by tax competition 
and resulting in a race to the bottom (Avi-Yonah 2000), most of the literature on the empirical 
effects of treaties and treaty shopping comes from the disciplines of international relations, 
political economy and public finance economics (Arel-Bundock 2017; Balabushko et al. 2017; 
Hearson 2021; Janský & Šedivý 2019). This is where our main contribution to the literature 
lies. 
 
Conventional wisdom had associated decreased taxes with increased investment and 
increased investment with additional economic growth. While the intensity of the causal 
mechanisms at play between taxes, investment and economic growth was a traditional subject 
of academic debate, this conventional wisdom has been challenged more fundamentally over 
the last years (Beer and Loeprick 2018; IMF 2014; IMF, OECD, United Nations and World 
Bank 2015; Reurink and Garcia-Bernardo 2020). The idea that bilateral treaties increase 
foreign direct investment is seldom supported by empirical evidence (Brada, Drabek and 
Iwasaki 2021; Davies 2004; IMF 2014), and low-income countries have consistently been 
found not to benefit from treaties through additional FDI (Beer and Loeprick 2018; Neumayer 
2007). Signing treaties with investment hubs is not associated with increased investment; on 
the contrary, those treaties ‘tend to come with non-negligible revenue losses’ (Beer and 
Loeprick, 2018: 5-6). Some salient exceptions relate to conduits or treaty shopping hubs, such 
as the Netherlands (Weyzig 2013). Only when considering the networked nature of treaty 
shopping and its potential for treaty abuse and profit shifting has a significant positive effect on 
FDI been found for those treaties that most reduce multinationals’ tax obligations (Petkova, 
Stasio and Zagler 2019; van’t Riet and Lejour 2018). Moreover, research has identified 
pervasive methodological issues in the study of FDI effects of tax treaties, in that econometric 
studies finding positive effects miss exogenous variables such as the disintegration of the 
USSR or China’s transition to a market economy, which may have a direct effect in both FDI 
and the number of tax treaties (Lang, Pistone, Schuch, Staringer, Storck and Zagler 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, these direct foreign investment flows have little, if anything, in common with the 
usual greenfield FDI expectation whereby new factories, distribution or research and 
development centres are created (Meinzer, Ndajiwo, Etter-Phoya and Diakité 2019). Instead, 
recent studies suggest that 40% of global FDI stocks are ‘phantom’ FDI in empty shells with 
little activity, staff, nor production (Damgaard, Elkjaer and Johannesen 2019). A much higher 
ratio of phantom FDI is found in notorious corporate tax havens, such as the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Hong Kong, British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Singapore and the Cayman Islands 
(Damgaard et al. 2019). Thus, a substantial share of FDI may largely consist of holding and 
financing activities that exist mainly as accounting artifices to facilitate tax avoidance. Such 
inward FDI may be a proxy for the intensity of base erosion capacity out of an economy in the 
form of debt rather than an indicator for job creation and sustainable growth of the real 
economy.  
 
Phantom FDI may further consist of roundtripping capital, which is ultimately owned by 
domestic companies and is estimated to account for about 25% of FDI in China and Russia, 
between 10% and 20% in Canada and Indonesia, and between 5% and 10% for Germany, 
Italy, Spain, France and the United Kingdom (Damgaard et al. 2019). In addition, a large part 
of inward and outward FDI corresponds to sales or purchases of company shares, which may 
not come with increased expenditure in the host country (Head and Ries 2008). Estimates 
suggest that, since the 1990s, more than half of FDI reflects mergers and acquisitions (Chang, 
2011; IMF, 2014). With a sample of 29 OECD countries between 1987 and 2001, a study found 
that merger and acquisitions amounted to 82% of inward FDI (Head and Ries 2008). Other 
researchers also found tax treaties to be associated with higher cross-border flows of mergers 




if any, only for the investment bankers negotiating the deal (Schilling 2018). Importantly, FDI 
may not be desirable since quantitative and qualitative research indicates that foreign 
investment often leads to the worsening of labour conditions and environmental degradation 
(Durand 2007; Jorgenson 2007; Long, Stretesky and Lynch 2017; Maconachie, Srinivasan and 
Nicholas 2015). FDI data has been criticised more broadly for its lack of nuance and inherent 
unreliability (Linsi and Mügge 2019; Reurink and Garcia-Bernardo 2020). 
 
Another strand of political-economic literature has focused on tax treaty negotiation practices 
and outcomes (Barthel and Neumayer 2012; Hearson 2021; Mutava 2019; Schwarz and Rixen 
2009). While Schwarz and Rixen (2009) did not find empirical support for the role of power and 
investment asymmetries in the negotiation outcomes in their analysis of 45 German treaties, 
Hearson (2018) replicated their model with a more nuanced dataset and found that higher 
asymmetries in the FDI positions resulted in more unfavourable treaty provisions for poorer 
countries. Beyond the unequal investment position, He attributes a part of this outcome to 
unequal technical expertise (Hearson 2018). Hearson (2021) traces the role of interactions 
between technical experts and domestic interest groups in contributing to the expansion of the 
United Kingdom’s treaty network during the 1970s. He finds evidence that, instead of 
eliminating double taxation, British industry groups and civil servants were motivated by 
directly securing tax concessions to British businesses to obtain competitive advantages 
abroad or by disseminating OECD tax standards as an indirect means to achieve similar ends. 
Frequent interactions between public officials, lobbyists and private sector tax experts were 
found to be influential in setting negotiating priorities.  
 
It has also been found that countries often sign tax treaties for non-tax reasons (Brooks and 
Krever 2015), an issue that the Platform for Tax Collaboration (UN, OECD, IMF, World Bank) 
considers problematic (Platform for Collaboration on Tax 2021). Most recent analyses of 
African tax treaty practices point to governance challenges, for example, because of the 
absence of an explicit treaty policy guiding strategic choices and negotiations (Mutava 2019). 
Yet, there is also some evidence for a trend based on institutional learning in some developing 
countries towards more source-based negotiation positions after observing the effects of 
treaties in force (Kangave, Waiswa and Zzimbe 2016; Michielse 2012). To this end, the model 
tax convention developed by the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) shows a collective 
commitment in Africa to change treaty negotiation outcomes (ATAF 2012). 
 
Another body of more economic literature looks beyond the history and rationale of treaty 
negotiations and dynamics. It complements the legal analysis of the distributional aspects of 
treaties with economic data and estimates revenue losses and investment in response to 
treaties. As for the investment positions between residence and source countries, the IMF 
confirmed in 2014 that investment flows in lower-income countries are highly asymmetric and 
that low-income countries ‘are essentially “source” countries, the recipients of capital inflows 
and the site of production, not investors in business activities outside their borders’. (IMF 2014: 
11–12). Because of these considerations and concomitant treaty shopping, the IMF concludes 
that revenue losses to developing countries through tax treaties are of great concern (IMF 
2014).  
 
Across the entire spectrum of the literature on tax treaties, underlying economic assumptions 
of studies are either made explicit or remain implicit to varying degrees. In the interest of 
transparency, Table 1.1 attempts to summarise and stylise all relevant assumptions, and 









Table 1.1 Stylised assumptions of underlying tax treaty literature and policy 
 
Stylised Assumption Our paper position 
Tax treaties are necessary for the avoidance of double taxation. Existing unilateral measures suffice to prevent almost all 
double taxation except for a handful of capital-exporting 
countries. These countries could implement unilateral 
measures to drastically reduce potential double taxation in the 
absence of treaty. 
Double taxation is quantitatively more important than double 
non-taxation. 
Unproven and highly unlikely, based on available empirical 
evidence. 
Treaty shopping is the main source of revenue losses 
associated with tax treaties. 
Unknown; more likely true for most net capital exporters; more 
likely untrue for net capital importers. 
Tax treaty negotiations are positive-sum games in which 
concessions in source taxing rights are compensated by 
increased inward investment. 
 
- Double taxation is an obstacle to desirable 
investment and economic development. 
- Low tax rates lead to desirable greenfield FDI. 
- Lowering tax rates ultimately yield higher tax 
revenues through a growing tax base. 
 
Unproven and highly unlikely to hold, at least for country pairs 
with asymmetric FDI positions. 
 
Even if studies found an increase of inward FDI associated 
with tax treaties, these studies typically fail to a) estimate tax 
revenue losses, b) differentiate desirable greenfield FDI from 
merger & acquisitions, as well as from base eroding debt 
loading types of FDI (‘phantom FDI’), c) account for theoretical 
and empirical failure of the Laffer curve assumption, or d) 
include exogenous variables affecting FDI flows regardless of 
treaty-making.  
 
When double tax treaties are signed between a developed country (or a tax haven) and a 
developing country, the latter is usually the capital-importing party to the bilateral agreement. 
In other words, capital is expected to flow into the developing country as investment and the 
income resulting from the investment is expected to mostly flow out from the developing 
country to a tax haven or a developed country. Given that the function of double tax treaties in 
relation to dividends, interest and royalty payments is to restrict the tax that the source country 
can withhold on the outflows, then, almost by definition, developing countries will forego 
substantially more revenue in absolute and relative terms than their capital-exporting 
counterparty (Hearson 2018; Picciotto 1992). 
 
 
1.3 Contribution to literature 
 
We make a first contribution to the literature by specifying and updating the extent of 
asymmetrical FDI positions between different country groupings with data as of 2018. There 
are large differences in greenfield FDI positions between lower-income and higher-income 
countries (Figure 1.1, see also Figure A3.5 for a map of global FDI). The slope in the higher 
income country bracket is predominantly downward (visualised in red), indicating more 
outward than inward investment, i.e. net capital export. In contrast, the opposite holds for the 
lower-income country groups. Those with the strongest inward FDI position stand to suffer the 
greatest tax revenue losses from curtailing source taxing rights, e.g. by lower withholding tax 







Figure 1.1 Net greenfield FDI positions from OECD data by income level 
 
Several case studies have estimated the revenue losses caused by tax treaties. For the 
Philippines, Pakistan and Bangladesh alone, these losses amounted to almost US$800m in 
just one year (Janský & Šedivý 2019). A study found that the treaties that the Netherlands 
signed with developing countries led to more than €770m in lost revenue in 2011 (McGauran 
2013). Similarly, the IMF cites an estimate of revenue losses through US tax treaties to non-
OECD signatory states of US$1.6bn in 2010 (IMF 2014). For Ukraine, a research paper by the 
World Bank estimated the revenue losses caused by five treaties to amount to over US$300m 
in each of the two years under examination (Balabushko et al. 2017). More recent research 
provides dynamic estimates that take into consideration elasticities in dividend and interest 
flows, finding lower but non-negligible estimates of annual revenue forgone, to the tune of 
US$410m to 444m for South Africa (Janský, Lánička and Palanský 2020). 
 
The importance of tax treaties in the context of aggressive tax planning is evident by 
contrasting effective average tax rates of withholding payments in treaty and non-treaty 
situations. For the European Union, the effective average rate on royalty payments is 40.7% 
in the absence of a treaty; however, the rate goes down to 2% if tax treaties are available 
(Spengel, Zentrum für Europaïsche Wirtschaftsforschung European Commission and 
Directorate-General for Taxation and the Customs Union 2016: 5).  with regard to offshore 
profit shifting via interest payments, the effective tax rate is 36.4% without and 16.2% with a 
treaty (Spengel et al., 2016: 5).  
 
A body of literature has analysed the quantitative aspects of treaty shopping on a global scale, 
factoring in the actual use of treaties for routing FDI and income streams. Because of network 
externalities, even a single treaty can greatly affect a country’s tax base (IMF 2014b: 27) if the 
treaty partner has various low or no tax treaties. The networked nature of tax rules creates 
opportunities for treaty shopping using the most favourable treaties to minimise the tax bill. In 
this regard, IMF research shows that the percentage of diverted income can reach 92% when 
a developing country signs a treaty with an investment hub (Beer and Loeprick 2018). Even if 
a bilateral treaty purportedly distributes taxing rights between two jurisdictions only, the treaty 
provisions are heavily exploited by companies in third countries, creating negative externalities 
(Arel-Bundock 2017). Company ownership data shows that these dynamics broadly split profit-
shifting enablers between conduits (intermediate jurisdictions such as the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg) and sinks (no-tax jurisdictions like Bermuda or the British Virgin Islands), where 
profits end up accumulating (Garcia-Bernardo, Fichtner, Takes and Heemskerk 2017).  
 
The fall of treaty withholding tax rates across the globe bears witness to the extent to which 
tax competition or tax war dynamics4 have resulted in a race to the bottom. This is both a 
 




consequence and a building block of tax avoidance and treaty shopping. According to the IMF, 
since 1980, average withholding tax rates have fallen by 30% for most types of income, while 
the average rates on qualifying dividends have fallen by almost 50% (IMF, 2014b: 68–69). The 
empirical data we collect on tax treaties in Africa confirm a race to the bottom in treaty 
withholding tax rates. Figure 1.2 illustrates the fall in African tax treaty withholding rates broadly 




Figure 1.2 Evolution of treaty withholding rates in treaties with African countries 
signed 1970-2017. Lines are smoothed using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing 
(lowess). 
 
Source: WHT rates extracted from IBFD WHT tables and ICTD Source Index dataset (2020); authors‘ own calculations. 
 
Note: Values correspond to average treaty rates in treaties in force as of 2020. 
 
Research is scant with respect to identifying the jurisdictions whose treaty network is most 
aggressive in the race to the bottom. One study has recently identified high-income countries 
and jurisdictions with big ‘financial centres’ as being most aggressive in curtailing source 
taxation rights in their attempt to secure the lowest possible rates for resident or treaty 
shopping investors. The Corporate Tax Haven Index 2021 found within a sample of 70 
jurisdictions that just 14 jurisdictions were responsible for more than 50% of global treaty 
aggressiveness. All of these were categorised as High-Income Countries by the World Bank 
and at least 9 out of 14 can be considered financial centres: United Arab Emirates (Dubai), 
France (Paris), United Kingdom (London), Switzerland (Zurich), Germany (Frankfurt), Ireland 
(Dublin), Netherlands (Amsterdam), Luxembourg and Cyprus (Tax Justice Network, 2021b). 
The aggressiveness of a treaty was established by comparing the legal provisions applicable 
between two treaty partners to the usual provisions agreed by each partner separately in its 
other treaties. 
 
However, the robustness of this study’s findings was constrained because of a number of 
factors. Firstly, the underlying model only incorporates withholding tax rates on three types of 
investment income as the sole indicator of taxing rights allocation and potential 
aggressiveness. Second, the data used for the tax treaty rates as reported by the source was 
sometimes inconsistent and, in a few cases, erroneous (see Appendix 1 Shortcomings in 
IBFD data). Thirdly, alternative measures of treaty aggressiveness were not tested. We seek 
to address these shortcomings in the present paper, asking two interrelated questions: one 




countries are most aggressive in clipping taxing rights through tax treaties in Africa? Secondly, 
how sensitive are the findings to different measures of treaty content and aggressiveness? 
 
To answer these questions and enhance the robustness of the answers over the earlier study, 
we replicate the original study by using data from a novel ICTD dataset on African tax treaties. 
Because this dataset contains measures of source taxing rights beyond withholding rates 
(including on permanent establishment rules), we adjust our model to estimate an alternative 
measure of aggressiveness that takes into account a range of crucial qualitative characteristics 
of tax treaties, which have long been missing from treaty network analyses (Balabushko et al. 
2017; Beer and Loeprick 2020; van’t Riet and Lejour 2014). The treaty assessment framework 
introduced by Hearson (2016) and developed through the ICTD dataset (Hearson, Carreras 
and Custers 2021) provides a new basis allowing the study of treaty networks.  
 
In the remainder of this paper, we use and compare the existing sources to provide a new and 
comprehensive network analysis of tax treaties. It is comprehensive in various ways. Firstly, 
we focus on source countries’ tax rights, considering that the situs of economic activity is of 
utmost importance. Secondly, we assess each treaty in the context of each jurisdiction’s treaty 
network, allowing for country-specific policy insights. Thirdly, we test the robustness of our 
conclusions with a model that integrates domestic tax law in the analysis of tax treaty networks. 
Finally, we expand treaty network assessments over and above withholding rates, nuancing 
straightforward quantitative factors with equally important qualitative variables. We expect the 
results to enhance our understanding of tax treaty dynamics and to allow us to derive 
hypotheses for future research.  
 
One limitation of our methodology warrants brief consideration. While tax treaty provisions 
enable different types of abuses, arguably the ‘arm’s length principle’ underpinning most 
transactions between related economic parties across borders is a more fundamental flaw in 
enabling profit shifting, base erosion and tax avoidance than any treaty provision. This principle 
has been described by the OECD as follows: 
 
The basic approach […] is to require the determination of the profits under the fiction 
that the permanent establishment is a separate enterprise and that such an enterprise 
is independent from the rest of the enterprise of which it is a part as well as from any 
other person. The second part of that fiction corresponds to the arm’s length principle 
which is also applicable […] for the purpose of adjusting the profits of associated 
enterprises. 
OECD 2019: 458–459 
 
The core inconsistency of this fundamental ‘fiction’ in international taxation is the underlying 
reason for contemporary profit-shifting and tax avoidance concerns, and may only be 
overcome with a shift to unitary taxation. The shortcomings of this original misconception are, 
however, outside the scope of this study. In the next section, we proceed with formalising the 
modelling of treaty aggressiveness. 
 




Our analysis is based on two data sources. The first data source is the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), which provides country tables of WHT rates (IBFD, n.d.). The 
second data source is the Source Index dataset from the International Centre for Tax and 
Development (ICTD), a project co-funded by the World Bank and the G-24 Inter-governmental 




(Hearson, Carreras and Custers 2021) and captures the key characteristics of tax treaties 
signed by developing countries, including WHT rates, as well as manually coded variables on 
permanent establishment and other treaty provisions. A detailed explanation is included below 
and summarised in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Comparison of IBFD and ICTD. Three types of rates, raw rates, coded values 
and indices. 
 
 IBFD ICTD 
Raw treaty rates 
WHT dividend Qualifying and non-qualifying FDI and portfolio 
WHT interest Main and qualifying rates Main and loans from banks 
WHT royalty Main and qualifying rates Main, copyright and equipment 
WHT services - Technical/management fees 
 
Raw domestic rates (IBFD only) 
WHT dividend Main and qualifying rates 
WHT interest Main and qualifying rates 
WHT royalty Main and qualifying rates 
 
Coded values (ICTD only) 
WHT dividend coded All eight sub-components in the raw data were normalized from 0 to 1. Zero corresponds 
to a 0% WHT rate, and 1 corresponds to a WHT rate greater than 20%, or the absence 
of a rate in the treaty.  
WHT interest coded 
WHT royalty coded 
WHT services coded 
PE  Eight provisions are coded in the dataset with respect to permanent establishment. A 
value of 1 corresponds to broader PE definition under the UN model, while values closer 
or at 0 corresponds to PE exceptions under the OECD model (see below Coded 
Variables). 
Other provisions (Other)  Eight additional provisions relative to source taxing rights are coded in the dataset. For 
each, a value of 1 corresponds to treaty language conferring taxing rights to the source 
country under the UN model, while values of 0 are coded for tax limitations pursuant to 
the OECD model (see below Coded Variables). 
 
Indices (ICTD only) 
PE Average across the eight provisions coded. 
WHT rates Average over the four WHT rates coded 
Other Average across all remaining coded fields 
SI Average over the three indices above 
 
2.1.1 IBFD dataset 
 
The IBFD Research Platform contains quick-reference tables giving the withholding tax rates 
provided in bilateral and multilateral treaties in force for each jurisdiction.5 In particular, there 
is information on two withholding tax rates on dividends (qualifying and non-qualifying), as well 
as varying numbers of withholding tax rates for interest and royalty. The IBFD WHT tables 
have some mild shortcomings in terms of coverage and accuracy. In terms of coverage, the 
number of WHT rates is not consistent across countries. For instance, the qualifying rate for 
publicly-owned companies and institutions may or may not be shown on the Interest column 
of the WHT tables. Moreover, multilateral tax treaties are not usually covered and so we added 
them manually. A symmetric bilateral treaty is sometimes presented differently in the WHT 
table of each treaty partner. In such situations, we selected the data in the WHT table that 
showed a higher number of WHT rates. For example, because the IBFD WHT table for Italy 
presents two interest WHT rates with respect to Algeria (0/15), while the table for Algeria 
presents only one WHT rate with respect to Italy (15), we retain both rates. Appendix 1 gives 
a more complete account of the cleaning process for IBFD data. 
 
 
5 We disaggregated the multilateral treaties into the corresponding bilateral treaties and confirmed that the information for the pair 
of countries A-B was consistent with the information for the pair B-A. In the case of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (CEMAC) and the Arab Economic Union Council (AEUC), we found discrepancies in WHT tables, checked the original 




Finally, we obtained the average WHT rate for dividends6, interest and royalties by averaging 
all available rates within each type of income. In the example, the WHT rate for interest in the 
Algeria-Italy treaty would be 7.5%. 
 




The ICTD data contains information on withholding rate limitations contained in bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, all manually coded. ICTD obtained the text of most treaties from the IBFD’s  
treaty collection, but worked from this raw text rather than its quick-reference tables. While the 
IBFD tables only present WHT data regarding dividends, interest and royalty payments, ICTD’s 
coding also includes WHT rates for management and technical service fees. In contrast with 
the IBFD tables, the ICTD dataset clearly categorises the different rates applicable to qualifying 
situations. For instance, every treaty presents two interest rates: a ‘main’ rate applicable to 
interest payments (default rate) and a rate for interest payable to banks and financial 
institutions. Moreover, two rates are available for dividends (FDI or ‘substantial holding’ and 
portfolio) and three rates for royalties (‘main’ rate, rate applicable to copyright payments and 
royalties for the use of equipment).  
 
As we did with the data from IBFD quick reference tables, we calculated the WHT rate for 
dividends, interest, royalties and services as the average of all available rates for each type. 
For instance, a treaty may provide that the maximum WHT rate chargeable by the source 
country on outbound royalty payments is 10% and provide a lower 5% rate for royalties 
qualifying as copyright payments (PWC 2004). Therefore, the royalties component would take 




A key difference between the approach taken by ICTD and the IBFD in its WHT tables is the 
presence of coded variables. In the coded values, values closer to 1 are assigned to treaties 
more favourable to the country where income arises (‘source country’) and values closer to 0 
correspond to treaties whose provisions are favourable to the country of residence of the 
investor (‘destination’ or ‘capital-exporting’ country). The coded variables come in two forms. 
Firstly, the coded information of the eight withholding tax rates ranges from 0 to 1. Zero 
corresponds to 0% WHT rate and 1 corresponds to WHT rates equal to or greater than 20, or 
the absence of a rate in the treaty. The coded variables for dividend, interest, royalties and 
services are again calculated as the average of all available rates for each type. Secondly, the 
ICTD dataset provides coded variables on ‘PE’ and ‘Other Provisions (Other)’.  
 
There exist eight coded variables for ‘PE’, which correspond to eight different provisions found 
in Article 5 of the UN and OECD model conventions (OECD 2017; United Nations 2017). 
Provisions relating to PE exceptions for supervisory activities, delivery services, insurance and 
agents are coded using the UN model as reference. Zero is coded where these exceptions are 
granted following the OECD model, while 1 corresponds to provisions following the UN model. 
Otherwise, two provisions assessing the time length that triggers PE qualification are 
normalised from 0 to 1. Zero corresponds to a length of 24 (construction) or 12 (services) 
months, and 1 corresponds to treaties where construction and services activities automatically 
trigger PE (0 months requirement). 
 
There exist eight coded variables for ‘Other provisions (Other)’. Although not directly linked to 
PE or WHT, these treaty characteristics can constitute a significant source of revenues or 
 
6 The average of qualifying and non-qualifying dividend rates probably yields an over-estimation of the most common treaty rate. 
Indeed, research combining micro and macro data finds that qualifying rates are applied to at least 80% of dividend payments 




losses for source jurisdictions. For example, provisions such as source taxation of shipping 
income, absence of deduction for payments to head office, taxation of capital gains on shares 
of resident companies or source taxation of income not specifically covered by the agreement 
are coded for each treaty. All eight variables are coded by reference to the UN model, where 
a provision substantially equivalent to the UN provisions is coded 1 and a provision following 
the OECD model coded 0.  
 
This coding is consistent with the fact that the OECD model comparatively restricts source 
taxing rights in these regards. A full account of the different variables is provided in the table 




Appendix 2 Variables included in the Source Index dataset. 
 
Indices 
Finally, the ICTD has created three sub-indices and one index based on coded variables. The 
first sub-index, WHT rates, corresponds to the average of the four coded WHT rates (dividend, 
interest, royalty and services). The second, PE, corresponds to the average of the eight coded 
PE variables. The third, Other, corresponds to the average of the eight coded variables on 
other treaty provisions. Finally, the index SI corresponds to the average of the other three 
indices.7 
 
2.2 Comparison of IBFD and ICTD dataset 
 
Our first goal is to understand the similarity between the IBFD tables and ICTD dataset. An 
overall high similarity would show the potential of the IBFD tables in the analysis of tax treaties, 
despite shortcomings. Reciprocally, it would validate the Source Index treaty dataset as a 
reference source for the study of tax treaties, to the same extent as IBFD. Our main goal is to 
understand to what extent our analysis of the most aggressive treaties and treaty partners is 
robust when considering other treaty data, such as PE and other relevant provisions. 
 
We kept all tax treaties with an African partner for both datasets, excluding the Seychelles and 
Mauritius. These two countries were excluded since their withholding and corporate income 
tax rates are effectively 0%8, and thus other countries cannot be aggressive towards them. 
Moreover, we only kept treaties currently in force – the ICTD dataset includes over 200 treaties 




Firstly, we investigated the differences in coverage between the two sources. Out of 455 
treaties in force, 415 (91.2%) were found in both sources, ten only in the IBFD dataset and 30 
only in the ICTD dataset. We find these differences due to residual differences in coverage. 
Otherwise, minimal treatment of duplicated treaties was needed in ICTD data due to the 




We calculated the similarity between the two datasets in relation to the withholding tax rates 
on dividend, interest and royalty. We see a general good correlation between the two sources 
(Spearman’s rank coefficients of 95, 83 and 93% respectively, Figure A1 in Appendix 3 
Additional results and figures). A possible source of discrepancies derives from the way 
WHT data is presented in each dataset. While the categories are quite similar for dividends (2 
categories in both IBFD and ICTD), discrepancies may arise in the case of interest and 
royalties, for which ICTD provides two categories and IBFD only one (see Appendix 1 
Shortcomings in IBFD data). The significant discrepancies that can be observed in the case of 
 
7 A fifth index, which measures conformity with the UN model convention, has not been analysed in this paper. 
8 In Seychelles, although the ‘statutory’ withholding tax rates are at 15%, companies established in the Seychelles International 
Trade Zone are fully exempt from withholding taxes, as well as corporate income tax (Muyaa 2020a). More generally, all 
Seychelles companies are fully exempt on foreign income, pursuant to the principle of territoriality (Muyaa 2020b). In Mauritius, 
0% withholding tax rates are available for all types of income (IBFD 2021). Otherwise, locally incorporated ‘Authorised Companies’ 
are considered non-resident for tax purposes (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 2021b). Only subject to tax on domestic source 
income, non-residents are fully tax-exempt on foreign source income (Ramloll 2021). Authorised Companies can engage in a 
wide range of economic activities, with the exception of certain financial and corporate services (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) 
2021b; Sunibel Corporate Services 2019). In addition to Authorised Companies, Mauritius offers full tax exemptions in all other 
economic sectors (Tax Justice Network, 2021). 
 
9 A total of 41 treaties were duplicated. In those cases, we kept the treaty with the latest date of signature. For example there are 
two treaties in the ICTD database between UAE and Egypt, one from 1973 with no withholding tax rates and one from 1994 with 




interest are caused by the differences in coverage of qualifying rates between the two datasets 
(see Figure A1 in Appendix 3 Additional results and figures). While ICTD consistently 
records qualifying interest rates applicable to financial institutions, other qualifying rates are 





2.3.1 Aggressiveness of a treaty 
 
Our main contribution is to understand the aggressiveness of each treaty—the extent to which 
a treaty decreases the taxing rights of African countries (source countries). We measure the 
aggressiveness in terms of how much a treaty disadvantages the source country compared to 
all other treaties signed by the African country. Importantly, we do not intend to measure how 
effective taxation is affected by tax treaties, as this would require an in-depth analysis of 
domestic economies and tax systems. Rather, we study how tax treaties affect the ‘tax rights’ 
of source countries, analysing to what extent African countries give up the possibility to tax 
domestic source income effectively. 
 
For example, to understand the aggressiveness of Singapore with respect to Rwanda in 
relation to dividends withholding (Figure 2.1), we compare the WHT agreed between 
Singapore and Rwanda with those agreed between Rwanda and Jersey, Belgium, Mauritius 
and South Africa. This contextual comparison is performed not only for WHT rates but also in 
relations to PE and other treaty provisions. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Example of the assessment of treaty aggressiveness in Rwanda’s treaty 
network 
 
Formally, the aggressiveness, D, with respect to, for example, raw withholding tax rates on 
dividends (component k) of Singapore (country i) on Rwanda (country j) is defined as 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑘 =  {
𝑘𝑗,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝑘𝑖𝑗
0
  
𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑗,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝑘𝑖𝑗 > 0
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
, (1) 




where 𝑘𝑖𝑗 is the withholding tax rate on dividends agreed between Singapore and Rwanda and 
𝑘𝑗,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅  is the average value of the WHT rate on dividends in all treaties between Rwanda (country 
j) and all its treaty partners, excluding Singapore (country i)—the average ‘otherwise available’ 
in Rwanda.  
 
We can notice that 𝑘𝑖𝑗 is defined so that higher values represent treaty characteristics that are 
more favourable to the source country—the subsidiary's country. The higher the withholding 
rate in the treaty between Singapore and Rwanda, the higher the taxing rights that Rwanda 
maintains on subsidiaries of Singaporean firms.  
 
Importantly, to assess the overall aggressiveness of a country’s tax treaty network, only the 
positive differentials are considered. If the value 𝑘𝑗,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝑘𝑖𝑗 is negative (i.e., when the treaty 
offers worse conditions than the average treaty signed by j), we set it to zero. We choose to 
set it to zero because negative differentials do not have a clear mitigating effect with regard to 
the aggressiveness and impact of positive differentials (e.g. jurisdiction shopping, race to the 
bottom). In any case, the difference between averaging all differentials or considering only 
positive differentials is small (Figure A3.2). 
 
The example associated with Figure  is detailed in Table 2.2. For example, the aggressiveness 
with respect to WHT on dividends of Singapore towards Rwanda is 3.125, the difference 
between the average WHT for all treaties of Rwanda excluding Singapore (10.625) and the 




Table 2.2. Aggressiveness of WHT on dividends for Rwanda 
 
Country i Country j WHT on 
dividends ( 𝑘𝑖𝑗) 
Average WHT, excluding i (𝑘𝑗,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ) 𝑘𝑗,𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ −  𝑘𝑖𝑗 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑘   
Singapore Rwanda 7.5  10.625  +3.125 3.125 
Jersey Rwanda 10  10  0 0 
Belgium Rwanda 7.5  10.625 +3.125 3.125 
Mauritius Rwanda 10  10 0 0 
South Africa Rwanda 15  8.75 -6.25 0 
 
2.3.2 Types of aggressiveness  
 
We define five types (or models) of aggressiveness (Table 2.3). The first four are based on 
WHT rates, while the fifth is based on WHT rates, PE and Other provisions.  
 
Table 2.3 Three different models to measure aggressiveness. See Table 2.1 for a 
difference between the raw, coded and indices data 
 
Name Measurement Components k 
M1-IBFD WHT Raw treaty WHT rates on dividends, interest and royalties 
M1-ICTD WHT Raw treaty WHT rates on dividends, interest, royalties and services 
M2-IBFD WHT DOM Raw treaty and domestic WHT rates on dividends, interest and royalties 
M3-ICTD WHT Coded treaty WHT rates on dividends, interest, royalties and services 
M4-ICTD SI Indices WHT rates, PE and Other 
 
 
Firstly, M1-IBFD uses raw WHT data on three components (k): WHT rates on dividend, interest 
and royalty. Secondly, M1-ICTD uses raw WHT data for the same three components, plus 
services WHT (all from the ICTD dataset). Thirdly, M2-IBFD uses the raw IBFD data but 
compares the WHT rate with the domestic rate of the treaty partner (𝑘𝑗
𝑑𝑜𝑚), instead of the 
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Fourthly, M3-ICTD uses coded WHT data on three components (k): WHT rates on dividend, 
interest and royalty. Finally, M4-ICTD aggregates the three indices provided in the ICTD 
dataset: WHT rates, PE and Other. These two last models use Equation 1. 
 
The total aggressiveness of a treaty for the models is the sum of aggressiveness for the three 
components k: 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑗  =  ∑ 𝐷𝑖𝑗
𝑘
𝑘 .  (3) 
 
 
2.3.3 Aggressiveness of a country 
 
The total aggressiveness of a country, 𝐴𝑖 is calculated by summing the aggressiveness of 
country i with all partners and normalised by the maximum aggressiveness. This allows us to 
compare different countries’ aggressiveness on a scale from 0 to 100, with the highest value 
being that of the most aggressive jurisdiction. The relative values are maintained and thus, no 
information is lost in the process. 
 
𝐴𝑖
𝑟𝑎𝑤  =  ∑ 𝑎𝑖𝑗  𝑗     (3) 
 








3.1 Aggressiveness towards WHT rates 
 
We start by analysing the top aggressors with respect to raw WHT rates. We find an 89% 
correlation between results using IBFD and ICTD raw WHT data (Figure A3, Appendix 3 
Additional results and figures). For both data sources, the main three aggressors are France, 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Mauritius (Figure 3.1). Their aggressiveness arises from 
different sources. France shows unmatched aggressiveness in royalties WHT. In the case of 
the UAE, aggressiveness derives from securing reductions in WHT on dividends and, to a 
lesser extent, on interest and royalties. In Mauritius, the three components are roughly equally 
important. The most aggressive reductions of source taxing rights via royalties are found in 
France, Mauritius, South Africa and the United Kingdom. With regard to services WHT (only 







Figure 3.1 Comparison of the results between IBFD and ICTD for the top 15 countries of 
M1-ICTD. 
 
Next, we review some salient differences between the ICTD and IBFD results. We observe 
that France is found to be particularly aggressive with respect to royalties in IBFD data but less 
so in ICTD data. After closer examination, both aggressiveness measures are similar, but the 
IBFD measure is normalised with the highest aggressiveness for the UAE. In contrast, the 
ICTD measure is normalised using France as having the highest aggressiveness (which is 
higher in absolute terms). In the case of the UAE, the aggressiveness measured with IBFD 
data is higher for dividends and royalties due to the more aggressive rates recorded under the 
UAE-Morocco treaty and also due to the inclusion of the UAE-Sudan treaty with very low WHT 
rates.  
 
South Africa, in contrast, is shown as particularly aggressive with respect to royalties in ICTD 
data, but to a much lesser extent in IBFD data. This is due, in part, to the exclusions for royalties 
for the use of equipment in the ICTD dataset. If payments for the use of ‘industrial, commercial 
or scientific equipment’ are not included in the definition of royalties, ICTD data follows the 
legal determination that such payments cannot be taxed at source.10 For example, that is the 
case for South Africa’s treaties with Tanzania, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. On average, royalties 
WHT are around 20% lower in ICTD data than in IBFD. This difference in the interpretation of 
treaty language between ICTD and IBFD reveals more accentuated aggressiveness profiles 
for certain countries. Otherwise, the aggressiveness of South Africa with regard to services 
WHT is significant. That is because 12 of its treaties do not provide source taxation of 
management and technical services fees. 
 
With regard to Zambia, although overall measures are comparable for both data sources, 
aggressiveness for interest and royalties is non-existent according to ICTD data. This is due 
to the interpretation, under ICTD, that the Zambia-Tanzania treaty does not impose limitations 
 
10 When payments for the use of equipment are not included in the definition of royalties in Article 12 (UN and OECD models), the 
income of the recipient company is considered under Article 7 ‘Business Profits’, whose language provides that the income of a 
company is only taxable in its country of residence unless the company has a permanent establishment in the other country 
(OECD 2017; United Nations 2017). Thus, if the company receiving payments for the use of equipment does not have a permanent 
establishment in the source country, then the source country cannot charge any withholding tax on those payments (hence 0% 




on source tax rights for interest and royalties. Conversely, IBFD considers that the same 
criteria apply for all three types of payments; the income is exempt at source if it is taxed at 
destination (IBFD 2020g). Checking treaty language, we conclude that this criterion (exempt 
at source if taxed at destination) only applies to dividends and the inverse criterion (exempt at 
destination if taxed at source) applies to interest and royalties. Thus, aggressiveness under 
IBFD data might be overestimated by nearly 60%. 
 
Next, we asked how sensitive our results are to the operationalisation of aggressiveness. We 
first tested the alternative model M2-IBFD, in which aggressiveness is defined as the 
differential between the WHT rate in the treaty and the domestic WHT rate of the source 
country. We find that the results are consistent with those of M1-IBFD (Figure 3.2). The main 
discrepancies arise in four countries. The aggressiveness of the United Kingdom, South Africa 
and Switzerland increases. This implies that they can get more aggressive treaties when the 
domestic WHT rates are high. In particular, the United Kingdom increases its aggressiveness 
in interest and royalties WHT substantially due to treaties with Algeria, Sierra Leone, Malawi 
and South Africa. This discrepancy reveals that, even if, concretely, the UK’s treaties with 
these countries reduce applicable rates far below domestic rates, such lower rates are actually 
common in the countries’ treaty networks. It means that the domestic rates of these countries 
might not be commonly used since various treaties allow significantly lower tax rates.11 
Zambia’s aggressiveness decreases. This is due mainly to its tax treaty with Tanzania, which 
defines a WHT rate for dividends of 0%, while the average WHT rate in other treaties is 
16.25%, providing a high score in the M1-IBFD model. The domestic WHT on dividends is a 
relatively lower 7.5%, which decreases the score of the M2-IBFD model.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Aggressiveness using only treaty WHT rates (M1) or both treaty and domestic 
rates (M2), with IBFD data. 
 
It is worth noting that, contrary to the other models presented in this paper, M2-IBFD effectively 
considers all possible bilateral relations of each African country, including both treaty dyads 
 
11 For example, Algeria’s average domestic tax rate on interests is 25% (10% main rate, and 40% for interests derived from bearer 
securities). However, its average WHT across Algeria’s treaties is 7%. The UK-Algeria treaty provides for a tax rate on interests 
of 7%. Thus, while UK can be considered aggressive by reducing the average domestic tax rate from 25% to 7%, if we consider 
other applicable treaties (M1), the UK-Algeria treaty does not appear to be aggressive, as it does not reduce interest WHT below 




and dyads that are governed by domestic law. Indeed, when considering aggressiveness 
comparing applicable WHT (treaty or domestic) with domestic WHT rates, all non-treaty dyads 
are measured as ‘zero’ aggressive. This is because the withholding rate applicable to outbound 
flows in a non-treaty dyad is the domestic rate of the African country. Thus, the differential 
between such a rate and the domestic rate is null. Accordingly, only treaty dyads with rates 
that are lower than domestic rates are considered aggressive. 
 
Model specification M3-ICTD normalises the WHT rates between 0 and 1. This model seeks 
to consider both the limitations to source tax rights (as previous models) and the absence of 
limitation under the treaty. For instance, even if a treaty has a zero rate for qualifying interest 
payments, the aggressiveness of the treaty is reduced if there is otherwise no limitation for 
interest WHT. Again, the results are very consistent with those of M2-ICTD (Figure A3.3, 
Appendix 3 Additional results and figures). The aggressiveness of Mauritius and Zambia 
decreases, while that of the United Kingdom increases. The decrease of aggressiveness, in 
this case, is a reflection of the inclusion of treaties with no limitation to WHT in our sample. On 
the contrary, the United Kingdom can set limitations on most tax treaties they sign, leaving no 
room for the application of domestic law. 
 
The measures presented in the figures above result from the analysis of aggressiveness with 
raw WHT rates and should (in the case of ICTD data) be distinguished from measures based 
on coded WHT rates (see Section 2.1). Model M1-ICTD and models M1-IBFD and M2-IBFD 
use raw WHT while M3-ICTD and M4-ICTD use coded WHT in the assessment of sub-index 
values.  
 
Overall, when considering WHT only, the three most aggressive jurisdictions under both IBFD 
and ICTD data are France, the United Arab Emirates and Mauritius. While the former is an old 
colonial power, the latter two jurisdictions have developed as ‘offshore financial centres’, 
building on a clear tax haven strategy (Tax Justice Network 2019b; 2021a), and both have 
withholding taxes of 0% available under domestic law (IBFD 2020a; 2020c). Because these 
jurisdictions already provide 0% WHT rates to outbound payments, it might be easier for them 
to negotiate lower WHT in treaties with other countries. In the model that considers domestic 
WHT (M2-IBFD), it is also worth noting that the United Kingdom rises to second place, almost 
doubling its royalties aggressiveness (with respect to the other WHT models). 
 
3.2 European countries are more aggressive in relation to PE and other treaty 
provisions 
 
We proceed to expand our analyses beyond WHT to PE and other treaty provisions (Other). 
These provisions affect the source country by excluding economic activity from taxation 
altogether (if a foreign company is not considered to have a permanent establishment) or by 
preventing source taxation of specific activities (shipping or independent services) or income 
realisation events (sale of shares of a company). It is worth noting that each of the three 
categories or sub-indices considered is built as an average of coded variables chosen in the 
ICTD Source Index dataset (Hearson, Carreras and Custers 2021). As such, the authors’ 
decision to equally weight the three categories (WHT, PE, Other) rests upon the decision to 
include certain treaty provisions (coded variables) and not the others in the construction of 
each sub-index. Nonetheless, we consider that the weighting is fair insofar as it is balanced 







Figure 3.3 Aggressiveness measures for jurisdictions in the top 15 of any model, sorted 
by M1-ICTD for comparability. 
 
Interestingly, while Mauritius and the UAE are among the largest aggressors for WHT, they 
are not the largest aggressors with respect to permanent establishment and other treaty 
provisions. When comparing average aggressiveness towards African partners by treaty, we 
observe that Mauritius and the UAE are, on average, around 20% more aggressive than 
France and UK with respect to withholding rates. Conversely, the UK and France are eight 
times as aggressive as the UAE and Mauritius with regard to permanent establishment 
provisions. Other treaty provisions show a nuance, with the UAE and Mauritius being relatively 
less aggressive than France and the UK but comparable to Germany, Norway and Spain.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the aggressiveness percentage represented by WHT, PE and Other treaty 
provisions for the three most aggressive treaties signed by the UK, France, the UAE and 
Mauritius. 
 
Table 3.1 Source Index aggressiveness profiles for the most aggressive treaties of 
selected countries. 
 





% aggressiveness derived from 
WHT PE Other 
France Guinea 1.00 0% 75% 25% 
France Libya 0.86 59% 40% 1% 
France Namibia 0.71 13% 65% 22% 
United Kingdom Eswatini 0.89 25% 59% 16% 
United Kingdom Egypt 0.79 15% 61% 24% 
United Kingdom Morocco 0.74 0% 60% 40% 
Mauritius Tunisia 0.65 67% 5% 29% 
Mauritius Madagascar 0.63 55% 45% 0% 
Mauritius Congo, Rep. 0.46 46% 0% 54% 
United Arab Emirates Guinea 0.57 56% 0% 44% 
United Arab Emirates Tunisia 0.51 64% 0% 36% 





For instance, the United Kingdom’s treaty with Morocco, setting maximum WHT at around 
10%, is not particularly aggressive compared to other treaties signed by Morocco, whose 
average treaty WHT rates are close to 11%. However, the treaty does not include a provision 
for a services PE and specifically excludes delivery services, insurance and agents’ economic 
activity from PE qualification. Moreover, under Other provisions, it does not allow source 
taxation of shipping business or capital gains from shares of foreign-owned domestic 
companies and lets domestic companies deduct payments to the head office. The 
characteristics of PE and Other treaty provisions are significantly aggressive towards Morocco 
in reducing its taxing rights more intensely than other treaties signed by Morocco.  
 
When the relative harmfulness of individual treaties is compared (using M4-ICTD; see 
aggressiveness model in 2.3.1 Aggressiveness of a treaty) with the Source Index value for that 
treaty (average of 3 sub-indices), we generally observe consistent trends; yet interesting 
differences appear. In general, the lower the Source Index value of a treaty (more favourable 
to investor country), the higher its aggressiveness (downward pressure in source taxing rights). 
However, as Table 3.2 illustrates, certain treaties have a similar Source Index value but show 
markedly different levels of aggressiveness and vice-versa.  
 
Table 3.2 Comparison of harmfulness assessments by treaty between SI values and M4 
aggressiveness. 
 







WHT s.i. WHT 
agg. 




Egypt Italy 0.43 0.68 0.94 0.00 0.09 0.49 0.25 0.19 
Egypt China 0.42 0.24 0.33 0.17 0.56 0.01 0.38 0.06 
Tanzania India 0.64 0.43 0.34 0.43 0.95 0.00 0.63 0.00 
Tanzania Italy 0.39 0.30 0.72 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.25 0.14 
South Africa Brazil 0.40 0.29 0.59 0.00 0.09 0.29 0.50 0.00 
South Africa Algeria 0.38 0.04 0.41 0.00 0.34 0.04 0.38 0.00 
 
Note: the colour coding above reflects that in M4-ICTD, higher values correspond to more aggressive treaties, whereas in the 
Source Index, higher values correspond to treaties that are more favourable to source countries. 
 
In these treaties, our approach measuring harmfulness with the relative aggressiveness of 
each treaty (in comparison to other treaties of the source country) brings significant new 
insights. For instance, while Egypt’s treaties with Italy and China have very similar Source 
Index values, the Egypt-Italy treaty appears much more aggressive (M4-ICTD) than the Egypt-
China treaty. This is because although the treaty with China is more aggressive with respect 
to tax rates (with lower dividends, interest and royalties WHT), the treaty with Italy includes 
very aggressive PE provisions that are overall significantly more harmful than PE provisions 
found in Egypt’s other treaties. Furthermore, in the Egypt-China treaty, where the Source Index 
assesses that WHT and Other treaty provisions have very similar levels of harmfulness (WHT 
s.i. = 0.33, Other s.i. = 0.38, with higher values corresponding to more source tax rights), our 
aggressiveness model (M4) estimates that China’s harmfulness with regard to Other treaty 
provisions is notably lower than its harmfulness due to Withholding rates (WHT agg. = 0.17; 
Other agg. = 0.06). Thus, although in absolute terms, Egypt’s treaty with China might be as 
harmful as the one with Italy, in relative terms, the Egypt-Italy treaty is much more harmful 
because its provisions deviate much more from that of Egypt’s other treaties. Specifically, 
although Other treaty provisions in the treaty with China might not be that favourable to source 
tax rights, these appear to be the norm across Egypt’s treaties. Therefore, we could conclude 
that such a choice of treaty provisions simply corresponds to Egypt’s treaty policy stance. In 
addition, the relative assessment presented with our aggressiveness models (M1-5) may shed 






In comparison with M1-IBFD and M1-ICTD (solely based on WHT), we can generally observe 
that OECD countries increase their measure of aggressiveness. Other than the United 
Kingdom and France, countries such as Italy, Norway, Germany, South Korea, Portugal, the 
Netherlands and Spain are among the top 15 most aggressive. The fact that these countries 
are highlighted when considering aggressiveness with the Source Index’s three broad 
categories may be because OECD countries have followed the OECD tax treaty model closely 
in negotiations and the resulting provisions are particularly harmful to source taxing rights (as 
is the OECD model). However, this would not explain why the aggressiveness derived from 
permanent establishment and other provisions is disproportionately higher than that derived 
from withholding rates. Instead, this characteristic could be due to a higher negotiating power 
and expertise in these rich OECD countries, which could result in a ‘trade-off’ between 
concessions for more straightforward and easily understandable withholding rates, in 
exchange for demands with regard to more obscure provisions such as permanent 
establishment exceptions or taxation of other income not specifically covered by the treaty 
(Hearson 2018). 
 
The use of Source Index data enriches the study of treaty networks by illustrating how less 
easily quantifiable treaty characteristics are relevant dimensions often ignored in treaty 
analyses. It is worth reiterating how a single provision relating to PE or Other treaty 
characteristics (capital gains, shipping rights etc.) can effectively allow multinational 
companies engaged in specific activities to escape source taxation completely. 
 
3.3 Aggressiveness per cluster 
 
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 have shown how specific sets of countries (e.g. the UAE and Qatar, 
Mauritius and Seychelles, European countries) are typically highly aggressive. We further 
investigate this by aggregating jurisdictions in clusters and calculating the average 




Figure 3.4 Relative aggressiveness of jurisdictions in different groups. GCC=Gulf 
Cooperation Council. Latam = Latin-America. Sink-OFC = sink-offshore financial 
centres (Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2017). See Appendix 3 for a list of countries in each 
region. 
 
Overall, rich countries are more aggressive in hindering African countries' rights to tax 
domestic economic activity. In particular, the richest countries (members of the G7, G20, the 
European Union pre-Brexit (EU28), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the OECD12) are 
 




disproportionately aggressive in terms of permanent establishment and other treaty provisions, 
with average aggressiveness up to 700% higher than other countries. Countries in the G24 
and G77 groups are significantly less aggressive in their treaties with African countries. The 
three Latin American countries in our sample (Brazil, Chile and Mexico) are nearly 100% less 
aggressive than other countries. Finally, the African tax havens of Mauritius and Seychelles 
(MUS/SYC) are extremely aggressive towards African countries in terms of WHT rates. Similar 
countries to Mauritius and Seychelles (sink-OFCs) are not generally aggressive towards 
African countries. 
 
In this case, as well, the differences may be due to the ‘success’ of the OECD tax convention 
among rich countries. However, it is worth noting that certain OECD countries show no or very 
low aggressiveness towards African treaty partners: namely Australia, Chile, Mexico, New 
Zealand, and Latvia. 
 
4 Conclusions  
 
Tax treaties constitute the backbone of tax planning by multinational corporations, hindering 
domestic revenue mobilisation in capital-importer countries. In this paper, we develop a novel 
methodology based on the network of tax treaties of African countries with three objectives: (i) 
to quantify which countries reduce the taxing rights of African countries and how much, (ii) to 
analyse the similarities between the IBFD and ICTD dataset and (iii) to understand the 
differences between the aggressiveness regarding withholding taxes and the aggressiveness 
regarding permanent establishment and other provisions.  
 
Our results provide a uniquely nuanced landscape of the countries providing opportunities for 
eroding tax bases in Africa through tax treaties. When considering treaty WHTs only, the three 
jurisdictions that most aggressively deviate from source countries’ usual treaty rates in both 
datasets are France, the United Arab Emirates and Mauritius. The analysis of PE and other 
treaty provisions reveals a different pattern, one that is completely dominated by European 
countries. Treaties with France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Germany reduce the scope of 
PE regulations in African countries the most. Overall, capital-exporter countries (China, OECD, 
GCC) and African corporate tax havens (mainly Mauritius) appear as disproportionately 
aggressive in tax treaties impairing African countries’ rights to tax domestic economic activity. 
 
Our analysis provides three important insights related to our three objectives. The broadest 
takeaway supported by our findings is that capital-exporting countries and African offshore 
secrecy jurisdictions and corporate tax havens are the most responsible for curtailing taxing 
rights in Africa. This can be explained by power dynamics between capital-exporter and African 
countries. The perceived dependence on foreign direct investment for development in Africa 
may be explained by a pervasive ‘competitiveness’ ideology, resulting in fiscal policies that 
may not be in the interests of these countries’ citizens. Supported by tax treaties, the stateless 
nature of multinational companies creates profit shifting networks that undermine domestic 
revenue mobilisation efforts by African countries, preventing the strengthening of key 
institutions such as public education, health care and infrastructures. The fragility of these 
institutions can result in mass migration due to environmental or economic shocks, 
destabilising, in turn, developed economies. 
 
The second lesson relates to objectives (ii) and (iii). We have shown that while both the IBFD 
and ICTD datasets are similar with respect to WHT rates, the effect of PE and Other tax 
provisions should not be understated. The aggressiveness of OECD countries – particularly of 
France and the United Kingdom – is understated when considering only WHT rates. The 
inclusion of PE and Other tax provisions in our analysis – only available in the ICTD dataset –
increases the aggressiveness of OECD countries while reducing the aggressiveness of China, 




to permanent establishment definitions and limiting source countries’ ability to tax specific 
activities and income realisation events, OECD countries obtain advantages for resident 
corporations that reduce the tax base of African countries. The pattern we observe among 
OECD countries may be explained by the adherence to the OECD model tax convention, which 
is generally unfavourable to source tax rights.  
 
The third key finding relates to the policy implication of our analysis. This paper and the 
associated results provide an effective analytical lens for policymakers and tax administrations 
to assess the potential harm or gain of a treaty. Recognising that every country is in a different 
economic position in its relations with other jurisdictions, this work can provide valuable 
insights into the treaties governing cross-border economic activity. In that regard, the 
aggressiveness measures presented in Appendix 3 can assist tax officials in deciding whether 
to renegotiate or terminate a treaty by determining how much a treaty deviates from the rest 
(see Table A3.2, Table , Table ). In combination with administrative data, this methodology can 
be used to assess priorities and strategies to strengthen domestic revenue mobilisation. 
Indeed, there has been a growing initiative among African countries to cancel or renegotiate 
harmful treaties in recent years. Kenya, Senegal and South Africa have done so with their 
treaties with Mauritius (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2019; Orbitax News 2015; 
TaxNotes 2020). 
 
Likewise, our findings could support reforms and legal cases within the European Union and 
its associated territories. The Lisbon Treaty obliges the European Union to implement policy 
coherence for development, whereby any EU member states’ policies – including tax policies 
– should ‘complement and reinforce’ the EU’s policy goals of reducing and eradicating poverty 
worldwide (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 2007: Article 208: 
C326/141). With our analysis adding to the empirical data on how EU member states’ tax 
policies hinder domestic resource mobilisation and anti-poverty policies in the Global South, 
the European Commission could consider taking action to review tax treaties in light of its 
commitment to implement the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (European Commission 2019).13  
 
Our analysis has a series of limitations that can spark new research on tax treaties. First of all, 
our methodology analyses the aggressiveness of country i on country j with respect to other 
partner countries of country j. However, the partners of country i are also important. If country 
i itself is extremely aggressive with regard to country j but has no other tax treaties, it is unlikely 
that country i is used for global tax planning schemes. Future research can include higher-
order network measures to address this limitation. The second limitation that could be 
addressed by future research relates to the causal economic effect of tax treaties. By analysing 
tax treaties in combination with different investment types (e.g. greenfield, phantom FDI), it 
would be possible to assess under what circumstances, if any, tax treaties are associated with 
desirable investment. Furthermore, by analysing corporate tax revenues after signing tax 
treaties, the impact of tax treaties on domestic revenue mobilisation could be quantified. 
  
 
13 If action by the European Council does not allow for significant overhaul of EU treaties with developing countries, the European 
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Appendix 1 Shortcomings in IBFD data 
 
1.1 Including within WHT tables treaties not in force 
 
The first category of issues we have encountered is that of treaties that appear in the WHT 
tables of a jurisdiction while being ‘not in force’. 
 
For instance, in the WHT table Yemen, ‘based on information available up to 19 February 
2020’, the document specifies ‘withholding tax rates applicable […] under the tax treaties in 
force as at the date of review’ (IBFD 2020f). The following treaties are shown (with 
corresponding rates): Algeria – Yemen (2002), Iraq – Yemen (2001), Morocco – Yemen 
(2006), Oman – Yemen (2002). However, when consulting the treaty text available in IBFD’s 
own database (IBFD n.d.), all these treaties are shown as ‘Not yet in force’ (as of April 2020). 
 
Similarly, in the case of Sudan, the IBFD WHT table presents treaties in force ‘up to 1 January 
2019’ (IBFD 2019a), and the following treaties are shown: Libya – Sudan (1990), Jordan – 
Sudan (2000), Iraq – Sudan (2002). However, these three treaties are not in force (as of April 
2020). 
 
1.2 Inconsistencies in WHT table reporting of the same treaty for the two treaty partners 
 
The vast majority of treaties in force today have reciprocal provisions. That is, the names of 
treaty partner jurisdictions only appear at the beginning of the treaty and all provisions 
generally refer to ‘one Contracting State’ and ‘the other Contracting State’ so that the treaty 
language applies interchangeably to either of the two treaty partners. Thus, one would expect 
that information presented for a specific treaty would be the same when consulting the WHT 
table of one treaty partner or the other. Yet, a significant number of treaties are reported 
inconsistently in the tables of each treaty partner. 
 
 
Figure A1.1 Differences in WHT rates in WHT tables of treaty partners (as of April 2020) 
 
The treaties shown in grey correspond to treaties where one partner does not have an IBFD 
WHT table. For instance, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Syria do not have WHT tables 
as of April 2020. Thus, while treaties signed by those countries might be presented in their 





More problematic are the cases where a treaty that is in force is reported very differently in the 
WHT tables of the two partners. For example, the treaties between Zambia and Tanzania, and 
between Zambia and Uganda are reported inconsistently (see Table A1.1).  
 
Table A1.1 Inconsistencies in rate reporting in WHT tables of treaty partners (as of April 
2020) 
 
The country WHT table where the treaty 




Zambia – Tanzania  - - - - 
Tanzania – Zambia  0 0 0 0 
Zambia – Uganda  - - - - 
Uganda – Zambia  0 0 - - 
 
A different but related issue is that the same information may be presented in different ways. 
When this occurs, it is often because the primary data presented is a dash ‘-‘, complemented 
by a footnote. For instance, in the WHT tables of Tunisia (IBFD 2020d) and Zambia (IBFD 
2020e), a dash ‘-‘ can mean both that there is no tax limitation under the treaty or that no tax 
can be levied at source (corresponding to a 0% rate). 
 
1.3 Inconsistencies in the treatment of multilateral treaties (WAEMU, AEUC, CEMAC, 
EU) 
 
1.3.1 Treaty not included for all signatories (WAEMU, AEUC) 
  
The West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or UEMOA in French) treaty is in 
force between Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, the Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo. The treaty is shown in the WHT tables of each of the treaty partners, except Senegal. 
For the countries showing the WAEMU treaty, the rates are consistent across countries. 
 
With regard to the Arab Economic Union Council (AEUC) Income and Capital Tax Treaty of 
1973, IBFD presents the said treaty in the WHT tables of three jurisdictions: Jordan, Sudan 
and Yemen. In those tables, a footnote indicates that ‘Members of the Arab Economic Union 
Council are: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Palestinian Autonomous Area, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen’. (IBFD 2020f) Yet, 
the treaty is not included in the WHT tables of most of these countries. 
 
1.3.2 Treaty inconsistently included for different signatories (CEMAC, AEUC) 
 
The Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC, for its initials in French) is a 
treaty between Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon. Here IBFD presents the CEMAC treaty in each of these 
countries’ WHT table, yet the data is different in each of the six cases. For instance, while the 
WHT table of Congo (Rep.) indicates a 20% limit on dividends WHT, the tables in all other 
countries indicate no WHT limitation under the CEMAC treaty. With regard to royalties, five of 
the six signatories show ‘-‘ for the rate, three of which indicate in a footnote that ‘no withholding 
tax is imposed if the income is subject to tax in the state’ of the recipient. Another of the 
countries showing ‘-‘ as the rate has a longer note saying ‘royalties are taxable in the state in 
which the recipient has his fiscal domicile’ and indicating an exception for source taxation of 
natural resources. Another of the countries showing ‘-‘ for the rate applicable to royalties WHT 
indicates that there is no limitation under the treaty. Finally, another country simply presents 
‘0’ as WHT applicable under CEMAC, without footnote. 
 





Two directives relative to WHT are in force in the European Union, which limit the withholding 
tax applicable to dividends, interest and royalties to 0% in cases where a parent company 
receives such payments from a subsidiary owned or controlled at 10% or more (25% for 
interest and royalties). The Parent-Subsidiary Directive (2003/123/EC) and the Interest and 
Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC) are multilateral treaties entered into by sovereign states in 
relation to withholding rates. However, instead of including the rates applicable under the 
directives among the treaty WHT rates, IBFD presents such rates among the ‘domestic’ rates, 
even if those rates are only valid for payments destined to a subset of countries. This is 
unfortunate in terms of analysis of bilateral and multilateral treaty rates because WHT rates 
under the directive have to be included for each European dyad. Importantly, Switzerland is 






Appendix 2 Variables included in the Source Index dataset 
 
Sub-Index inclusion UN model 
reference 
Description (value under UN an OECD models) Coding  
Permanent 
Establishment (PE) 
5(3)(a) Construction PE length in months (UN = 6; 
OECD=12) 
Proportional: 24 months 
or more months → 0; 
zero months → 1  
5(3)(a) Supervisory activities associated with construction 
(UN=yes, OECD=no) 
Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
5(3)(b) Service PE length in months (UN=6, OECD=not 
included) 
Proportional: No service 
PE, or 12 or more 
months → 0; zero 
months → 1  
5(4)(a) Delivery exception to PE (UN=no, OECD=yes) Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
5(4)(b) Delivery exception to PE (UN=no, OECD=yes) Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
5(5)(b) Stock agent PE (UN=yes, OECD=no) Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
5(6) Insurance PE (UN=yes, OECD=no) Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 




10 FDI dividend WHT in % (OECD=5) Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1  
10 Threshold shareholding in % (UN=10; OECD=25) Not coded 
10 Portfolio dividend WHT in % (OECD=15) Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1  
11(2) Main interest WHT in % (OECD=10) Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1  
11(2) WHT applying to loans from banks and financial 
institutions in % 
Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1  
12(2) Main royalties WHT in % (OECD=0) Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1  
12(2) WHT applying to payments for copyright in %  Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1 . 
12(2)&(3) WHT applying to payments for the use of equipment 
in %  
Proportional: 0% → 0; 
20% or more → 1  
12A Management or technical fees (UN and OECD = 
NA) 
Proportional: No 
specification of fees tax 
(NA) or 0% → 0; 20% or 
more → 1  
Other provisions 
(Other) 
7(1)(b&c) Limited force of attraction (UN=yes, OECD=no) Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1  
7(3) No deduction for payments to head office (UN=yes, 
OECD=no) 
Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
8(2) Source shipping right as a % (UN=yes[option B], 
OECD=no) 
Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
13(4) Source capital gains on 'Land rich' company (OECD 
and UN=yes, NA=capital gains article omitted) 
Binary: omitted provision 





13(5) Source capital gains on ‘other shares’ (UN=yes, 
OECD=no, NA=no article) 
Binary: omitted provision 
(NA) or OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
14 Independent personal services included (UN=yes, 
OECD=no) 
Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
16(2) Top-level managerial officials (UN=yes, OECD=no) Binary: OECD → 0; UN 
→ 1 
21(3) Source taxation of other income (UN=yes, 
OECD=no, NA=no article) 
Binary: omitted provision 








Appendix 3 Additional results and figures 
 
3.1 Figures  
 
 




















Figure A3.2 Difference between averaging positive and negative differentials or 
considering only positive differentials (see equation 1) 
 
 





Figure A3.4 Aggressiveness measured with raw WHT (M1) and coded WHT (M3) rates 





3.2 Model comparison tables 
 
Table A3.1 Comparison between Model 1-IBFD, Model 4-ICTD, and Source Index average 
 
 Model 1-IBFD Model 4-ICTD SI (av) 








France 100 11.7 22.6 48.5 100 21.1 54.6 24.3 0.36 
Mauritius 78 26 15.6 18.2 35.4 18.7 4.9 11.8 0.42 
United Arab 
Emirates 
75.6 33 19.3 13.2 42.6 22.9 6.6 13.1 0.38 
Qatar 59.4 23.1 16.3 12.3 23.5 16.3 1.2 5.9 0.42 
South Africa 54.8 7.6 13.1 18.2 29.4 12.3 13.2 4 0.47 
China 45.8 17.2 6.1 12.6 39 15.9 13.3 9.8 0.34 
Kuwait 45.8 14.9 16.1 5.8 21.5 12.7 0.4 8.5 0.39 
United Kingdom 45.5 10.6 8 14.5 84.9 12.6 45.5 26.8 0.32 
Switzerland 36.6 5.8 14.3 7.3 37.8 13 12.9 11.9 0.28 
Zambia 35.8 19.8 0 0 20.6 3.6 4.8 12.3 0.38 
Netherlands 33.3 5.5 10.1 8.6 40.7 9.7 18 13.1 0.3 
Saudi Arabia 30.3 10.9 10.5 6.2 8.5 8.5 0 0 0.51 
Tunisia 29.9 9 11.9 6.9 25.5 8 10 7.6 0.53 
Singapore 26.8 10.8 5.8 6.2 25.9 12.3 6.6 7 0.38 
Iran 25.4 6 5.3 6.8 11.6 9.9 0 1.7 0.43 
Ireland 24.8 6.7 7.2 8.2 21.2 7.1 10.9 3.2 0.34 
Portugal 24.5 2.5 5.4 11.1 35.2 3.9 21.9 9.4 0.36 
Seychelles 24.1 7.2 10 5.7 7.6 5.3 1.2 1.1 0.44 
Norway 23.7 0.1 5.8 11.5 43 6 22 15 0.41 
Sweden 22.8 2.1 5.1 5.6 16.5 3.6 7 5.9 0.5 
India 22.1 6 3.7 4.6 12.2 5.8 3.4 3.1 0.57 
Bahrain 21.8 7.5 5.5 6.6 8.6 7.1 1.4 0 0.44 
South Korea 21.3 5.9 0.8 5 42.9 5.6 24.5 12.8 0.27 
Germany 20.9 0.1 8.3 6.2 48.8 4.1 32.1 12.6 0.32 
Austria 20.8 1.4 5.1 9.5 31.8 5.4 16.3 10.1 0.23 
Spain 20.7 2 8.1 5.4 35 7.1 13 14.8 0.3 
Cyprus 17.7 4.1 5.9 6.1 11.6 5.2 3.1 3.3 0.31 
Turkey 17.1 1.3 1.9 5.1 35 5.8 18.3 10.9 0.28 
Russia 16.8 3.4 0.2 10.9 8.8 2.7 2.6 3.5 0.48 
Oman 15.8 7.1 3.5 2.6 7.1 4.4 2.7 0 0.47 
Denmark 15.1 0.1 4.2 5 30.4 2.8 16.2 11.4 0.38 
Mali 15 6.5 3.1 0.3 7.4 4.2 2.7 0.6 0.48 
Italy 14.3 2.4 1.6 2.5 55.6 1.1 34 20.5 0.32 
Belgium 12.7 2.6 3.6 4.3 20 1 6.5 12.4 0.44 
Malta 12.6 5.1 3 3.1 13.6 6.6 2.5 4.5 0.46 
Luxembourg 12.5 0.2 5.1 4 16.1 3.5 8.1 4.6 0.32 
United States 12.3 0.1 4.5 3 20.1 2.1 11.9 6.2 0.29 
Ethiopia 12.2 3.9 1.3 4.2 9.3 4.1 1.3 3.9 0.42 
Senegal 12.1 1.8 0.8 6.9 6 3 0.8 2.2 0.5 




 Model 1-IBFD Model 4-ICTD SI (av) 








Malaysia 12 9 0.2 2.7 11.4 2.2 4.5 4.7 0.41 
Canada 11.8 0.1 0 1.5 14.7 0 12.8 1.9 0.53 
Burkina Faso 11.2 2.6 3 2.6 4.9 2.8 1.5 0.6 0.47 
Hungary 9.4 0.1 3.5 3 20.7 2.6 10.8 7.2 0.33 
Romania 8.9 1 2.3 1.8 25.2 3.5 16 5.6 0.4 
Slovakia 8.8 0.1 4.6 2.6 16 4.1 7.8 4 0.39 
Algeria 8.8 0.5 3.8 1.6 8.5 6.3 0.4 1.8 0.56 
Croatia 8.7 1.8 3.5 0.6 6.1 2.7 0.8 2.6 0.38 
Finland 8.6 0.9 3.5 3 14.9 1.9 9.9 3 0.41 
Yemen 8.5 4.6 0 1.4 11.2 3 5.4 2.8 0.4 
Czechia 7.9 0.7 3.5 0 11.7 1.6 6.5 3.6 0.43 
Egypt 7.6 0 1.8 0.2 8.9 2.4 5.1 1.4 0.47 
Syria 6.9 4.7 0.2 0 3.7 1.6 1.8 0.3 0.52 
Israel 6.9 0 0.1 5.3 7.1 0.5 5.7 0.9 0.28 
Poland 6.5 1.2 0.5 0.7 18.1 1.2 11 5.9 0.36 
Mauritania 6.4 0 0 5.3 8.2 0 5.3 2.8 0.55 
Lebanon 6 1.5 1.2 3 11.8 1.4 3 7.5 0.33 
Greece 4.9 1.8 0.2 0 2.6 1.3 0.4 0.9 0.53 
Japan 4.8 3.5 0 0 13.8 1.4 9.8 2.7 0.29 
Taiwan 4.8 0.7 0.5 0 14.7 0 8.5 6.2 0.29 
Kenya 4.6 3.5 0 0 3.2 0 0.8 2.4 0.48 
Tanzania 4.6 3.4 0 0 3.2 0 0.8 2.4 0.39 
Cote d'Ivoire 4.2 0.9 0.8 0.3 1.8 1.2 0.6 0 0.52 
Bulgaria 4.1 1.4 1.2 0.6 11.6 1.2 5.7 4.8 0.41 
Uganda 3.9 3.4 0 0 3.2 0 0.8 2.4 0.38 
Indonesia 3.8 0.1 0.2 0 2 2 0 0 0.64 
Uzbekistan 3.7 1.7 1.3 0.7 1.3 1.3 0 0 0.61 
Malawi 3.7 0 0 3 3.4 0.6 2.8 0 0.24 
Mozambique 3.6 0 1.5 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.4 0 0.32 
Guinea 3.5 1.3 0.2 0 1.3 1.3 0 0 0.69 
Guinea-Bissau 3.5 1.8 0.7 0 1.4 0 1.4 0 0.49 
Niger 3.5 1.8 0.7 0 1.3 0 1.3 0 0.49 
Togo 3.5 1.8 0.7 0 1.3 0 1.3 0 0.49 
Georgia 3.5 0.5 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 0 0.7 0.57 
Albania 3.5 0.5 1.3 1.6 1.9 1.2 0 0.7 0.53 
Monaco 3.5 0 3.5 0 5.6 0.6 1.2 3.8 0.29 
Botswana 3.1 3.1 0 0 0.9 0.1 0 0.9 0.58 
Jordan 2.9 0.1 0.2 0 9.1 0.2 8.1 0.8 0.53 
Hong Kong 2.6 1.2 0 0.6 1.1 0.3 0 0.9 0.42 
Zimbabwe 2.5 1.5 1 0 1.5 0 0 1.5 0.48 
Vietnam 2.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 1.2 1.2 0 0 0.72 
Australia 2.4 0.1 1 0.6 0.6 0.6 0 0 0.36 
Ukraine 2.4 0.2 0.5 0.9 3.8 3.8 0 0 0.57 




 Model 1-IBFD Model 4-ICTD SI (av) 








Gabon 2.2 0 0.2 0 2.7 0.3 2 0.4 0.39 
Belarus 2.2 0.1 1.3 0 3.1 0 2.2 1 0.38 
Mexico 1.9 1.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.52 
Serbia 1.5 1.1 0 0.3 5.6 3.5 0 2.1 0.54 
Nigeria 1.3 0.6 0 0 0.5 0.1 0.4 0 0.42 
Latvia 1.2 1.1 0.2 0 0.7 0 0.7 0 0.48 
New Zealand 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.4 0 0.4 0 0.36 
Namibia 0.8 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.45 
Congo DRC 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.4 0 0.4 0 0.41 
Chile 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.9 0 0 0.9 0.36 
Iraq 0.7 0 0 0 11.3 0.2 9.2 2 0.43 
Somalia 0.7 0 0 0 11.3 0.2 9.2 2 0.43 
Thailand 0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 
Grenada 0.7 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 0 0.28 
Sierra Leone 0.7 0 0 0 3.3 3.3 0 0 0.28 
Libya 0.6 0 0 0 1.2 0 1.2 0 0.64 
Palestine 0.6 0 0 0 6.4 0.2 5.4 0.8 0.43 
Montenegro 0.6 0.5 0 0 2 0 0 2 0.53 
Philippines 0.6 0 0.6 0 1.7 0 1.7 0 0.51 
Pakistan 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.3 5 0 2.4 2.6 0.6 
North Macedonia 0.3 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0.7 
Ghana 0.1 0.1 0 0 1.8 0 1.8 0 0.34 
 
 
3.3 Country-by-country assessment of principal aggressors 
 
The table below (Table A3.2) yields results from a model based exclusively on treaty 
withholding rates. Thus, amendment or cancellation of treaties mentioned therein should be 
considered together with transaction data that the administration holds with respect to passive 
investment flows. To redress the aggressive aspects of treaties mentioned below, negotiating 
teams should consider the relative aggressiveness corresponding to different payment types 
(dividends, interest and royalties). Also, if the domestic withholding rates are lower than the 
rates considered aggressive under the model, governments should consider the amendment 
of such rates to produce positive revenue effects. Finally, as we discussed in this work, a 
number of provisions over and above withholding rates are of great importance for protecting 




Appendix 2 Variables included in the Source Index dataset). 
 
Table A3.2 Most disadvantageous treaty partners for each African country according to 
Model 1-IBFD (treaty rates) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
African country 
(excl. Mauritius and Seychelles) 




agg. of this 
particular 
treaty 
Share of total agg. 
received by this 
African country 
Principal aggressor (most 
aggressive treaty partner of 
African country) 
TZA Tanzania 9 45.6 59.8% Zambia* ZMB 
ZMB Zambia 22 27.9 33.4% Tanzania* TZA 
MDG Madagascar 2 25 100.0% Mauritius* MUS 
TUN Tunisia 55 24.4 10.8% Mauritius* MUS 
EGY Egypt 61 24 8.5% India* IND 
GIN Guinea 3 23.8 100.0% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
DZA Algeria 35 23 17.5% Qatar* QAT 
SDN Sudan 22 22.3 28.3% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
MOZ Mozambique 8 22 56.0% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
SEN Senegal 23 20.7 20.3% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
BFA Burkina Faso 9 20.1 59.4% Tunisia TUN 
ZWE Zimbabwe 15 18.6 35.9% Kuwait* KWT 
COG Congo, Rep. 5 18.2 51.0% Mauritius* MUS 
ZAF South Africa 79 17.5 4.5% Netherlands NLD 
NGA Nigeria 15 17.5 26.1% Spain* ESP 
MLI Mali 12 17.3 26.9% Russia* RUS 
TGO Togo 8 15 100.0% France FRA 
NER Niger 8 15 100.0% France FRA 
MRT Mauritania 14 15 100.0% Senegal SEN 
KEN Kenya 15 14.9 16.0% Seychelles* ¤ SYC 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 18 14.1 19.9% Portugal* ¤ PRT 
BEN Benin 9 13.1 29.7% Norway* ¤ NOR 
MAR Morocco 56 11.7 8.5% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
UGA Uganda 9 11.7 38.8% Zambia* ZMB 
LBY Libya 21 11.2 28.9% France FRA 
NAM Namibia 10 11.1 25.3% Germany* DEU 
BWA Botswana 14 10.5 32.7% Ireland ¤ IRL 
GNB Guinea-Bissau 8 10 100.0% Portugal* PRT 
MWI Malawi 5 10 57.1% United Kingdom* GBR 
GMB Gambia 6 9.7 45.4% United Kingdom* GBR 
ETH Ethiopia 23 9.6 8.8% Singapore* ¤ SGP 
CMR Cameroon 6 9.5 33.3% Gabon* ¤ GAB 
SWZ Eswatini 5 9.4 42.9% United Kingdom* GBR 
RWA Rwanda 5 8.1 72.2% Belgium BEL 
GHA Ghana 11 7.6 25.9% Netherlands NLD 
LSO Lesotho 3 7.5 80.0% United Kingdom* GBR 
GAB Gabon 10 5.8 15.8% South Korea* KOR 




COD Congo DRC 2 5 80.0% Belgium BEL 
SLE Sierra Leone 3   N/A  
TCD Chad 2   N/A  
CAF The Central African 
Republic 
3   N/A  
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 5   N/A  
AGO Angola 1 
 
 N/A  
COM Comoros 1 
 
 N/A  
LBR Liberia 1   N/A  
SOM Somalia 10   N/A  
STP Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1   N/A  
 
Note 1: Aggressiveness measures presented in column (3) may be misleading for countries with less than three treaties (see 
column (2)). 
Note 2: Where N/A is shown on column (5), this indicates all of the African countries’ treaties are homogeneous and no treaty 
partner appears as aggressive. 
(*) These countries provide complete relief from double taxation in the absence of a treaty (unilateral credit or exempt treatment 
for foreign-source dividends, interest and royalties). Cancelling or suspending the application of a treaty with these countries 
poses little or no risk of double taxation. 
(¤) As measured with Model1-IBFD: France and Norway are equally aggressive towards Benin; China and Ireland are equally 
aggressive towards Botswana; Gabon and Equatorial Guinea are equally aggressive towards Cameroon; Morocco and 
Portugal are equally aggressive towards Côte d’Ivoire; Ireland, Cyprus, Seychelles and Singapore are equally aggressive 
towards Ethiopia; Iran, Seychelles and the United Arab Emirates are equally aggressive towards Kenya. 
 
Table A3.3 Most disadvantageous treaties for each African country according to Model 
2-IBFD (domestic/treaty rates) 
 
The table below yields results from a model based exclusively on withholding rates (both 
domestic and treaty rates). Thus, amendment or cancellation of treaties mentioned therein 
should be considered together with transaction data that the administration holds with respect 
to passive investment flows. To redress the aggressive aspects of treaties mentioned below, 
negotiating teams should consider the relative aggressiveness corresponding to different 
payment types (dividends, interest and royalties). Finally, as we discussed in this work, a 
number of provisions over and above withholding rates are of great importance for protecting 




Appendix 2 Variables included in the Source Index dataset). 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
African country  
(excl. Mauritius and Seychelles) 




agg. of this 
particular 
treaty 
Share of total 
agg. received 
by this African 
country 
Principal aggressor (most aggressive 
treaty partner of African country) 
MOZ Mozambique 8 50 20.3% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
SLE Sierra Leone 3 50 52.6% Norway* NOR 
DZA Algeria 35 49.4 5.9% Qatar* QAT 
ZMB Zambia 22 47.5 11.7% Tanzania* TZA 
GIN Guinea 3 40 55.2% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
TUN Tunisia 55 39.6 5.1% Mauritius* MUS 
ZAF South Africa 79 33.8 2.5% Netherlands NLD 
MLI Mali 12 31.6 13.2% Russia* RUS 
COG Congo, Rep. 5 30.8 29.1% Mauritius* MUS 
MWI Malawi 5 30 38.7% United Kingdom* GBR 
LSO Lesotho 3 28.8 40.4% United Kingdom* GBR 
EGY Egypt 61 27.5 3.7% India* IND 
SEN Senegal 23 27.5 12.2% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
TCD Chad 2 27.5 50.0% Equatorial Guinea ¤ GNQ 
UGA Uganda 9 26.2 18.9% Netherlands NLD 
TZA Tanzania 9 26.2 72.4% Zambia* ZMB 
BFA Burkina Faso 9 21.9 40.3% Tunisia TUN 
TGO Togo 8 20 36.4% France FRA 
CPV Cape Verde 3 20 57.1% Portugal* PRT 
STP Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1 20 100.0% Portugal* PRT 
COD Congo DRC 2 18.8 55.6% Belgium BEL 
SWZ Eswatini 5 18.8 30.6% Mauritius* MUS 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 18 17.5 9.8% Portugal* PRT 
GMB Gambia 6 17.5 24.3% United Kingdom* GBR 
SDN Sudan 22 17 16.0% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
NER Niger 8 16 69.6% France FRA 
CAF Central African 
Republic 
3 15 33.3% France ¤ FRA 
MAR Morocco 56 12.5 6.1% United Arab Emirates* ARE 
RWA Rwanda 5 12.5 35.7% Belgium BEL 
BEN Benin 9 12 50.0% Norway* ¤ NOR 
NGA Nigeria 15 11.9 30.2% Spain* ESP 
GHA Ghana 11 11 14.8% Netherlands ¤ NLD 
NAM Namibia 10 10 14.0% Russia* ¤ RUS 
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 5 10 20.0% Central African Republic ¤ CAF 
GNB Guinea-Bissau 8 10 22.2% Portugal* PRT 
GAB Gabon 10 10 14.3% Congo, Rep. ¤ COG 
CMR Cameroon 6 10 39.2% Gabon ¤ GAB 
MDG Madagascar 2 7.5 100.0% Mauritius* MUS 
KEN Kenya 15 7.5 13.4% India* ¤ IND 




Note 1: Aggressiveness measures presented in column (3) may be misleading for countries with less than three treaties (see 
column (2)). 
Note 2: Where N/A is shown on column (5), this indicates all of the African countries’ treaties are homogeneous and no treaty 
partner appears as aggressive. 
(*) These countries provide complete relief from double taxation in the absence of a treaty (unilateral credit or exempt treatment 
for foreign-source dividends, interest and royalties). Cancelling or suspending the application of a treaty with these countries 
poses little or no risk of double taxation. 
(¤) As measured with Model2-IBFD: Norway and France are equally aggressive towards Benin; Equatorial Guinea and Gabon 
are equally aggressive towards Cameroon; Equatorial Guinea, France and Gabon are equally aggressive towards the Central 
African Republic; Equatorial Guinea and Gabon are equally aggressive towards Chad; Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Congo Rep. and Gabon are equally aggressive towards Equatorial Guinea; Ireland, Cyprus, Seychelles, Singapore, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are equally aggressive towards Ethiopia; Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Rep. and 
Equatorial Guinea are equally aggressive towards Gabon; the Netherlands and Denmark are equally aggressive towards 
Ghana; UAE, Iran, Seychelles, Qatar, South Africa and India are equally aggressive towards Kenya; Germany, United 
Kingdom, Malaysia, Mauritius and Russia are equally aggressive towards Namibia. 
 
Table A3.4 Most disadvantageous treaties for each African country according to Model 
4-ICTD (Source Index) 
 
The table below yields results from a model based on three types of treaty provisions (see   
ZWE Zimbabwe 15 4.6 47.8% Kuwait* KWT 
BWA Botswana 14 2.5 50.0% China* CHN 
MRT Mauritania 14   N/A  
LBY Libya 21   N/A  
LBR Liberia 1   N/A  
AGO Angola 1   N/A  
COM Comoros 1   N/A  




Appendix 2 Variables included in the Source Index dataset). Thus, amendment or cancellation 
of treaties mentioned therein should be considered together with tax residency and transaction 
data that the administration holds. In order to redress the aggressive aspects of treaties 
mentioned below, negotiating teams should consider the relative aggressiveness 
corresponding to different types of provisions (PE, WHT and Other treaty provisions). Also, 
when considering the cancellation of a treaty, the domestic legal environment should be taken 
into account, as potential loopholes or gaps in tax assessment might need to be addressed to 
produce a positive revenue effect. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
African country  
(excl. Mauritius and Seychelles) 




agg. of this 
particular 
treaty 
Share of total 
agg. received 
by this African 
country 
Principal aggressor (most aggressive 
treaty partner of African country) 
EGY Egypt 61 1 6.8% Austria* AUT 
GIN Guinea 3 1 63.8% France FRA 
DZA Algeria 35 0.9 10.9% Spain* ESP 
LBY Libya 21 0.9 16.9% Singapore* SGP 
KEN Kenya 15 0.9 17.4% South Korea* KOR 
SWZ Eswatini 5 0.9 62.5% United Kingdom* GBR 
GNB Guinea-Bissau 8 0.8 100.0% Portugal* PRT 
MAR Morocco 56 0.8 5.1% Germany* DEU 
BEN Benin 9 0.8 81.0% Norway* NOR 
ZAF South Africa 79 0.8 4.2% Netherlands NLD 
BWA Botswana 14 0.8 27.8% China* CHN 
SDN Sudan 22 0.7 17.3% Turkey* TUR 
NAM Namibia 10 0.7 26.0% Germany* DEU 
TZA Tanzania 9 0.7 20.0% Zambia* ZMB 
MOZ Mozambique 8 0.7 39.5% Italy* ITA 
TUN Tunisia 55 0.6 5.3% Mauritius* MUS 
SEN Senegal 23 0.6 15.1% Italy* ITA 
ZMB Zambia 22 0.6 13.9% Japan* JPN 
MLI Mali 12 0.6 35.9% Tunisia TUN 
MDG Madagascar 2 0.6 100.0% Mauritius* MUS 
GMB Gambia 6 0.6 38.5% Switzerland CHE 
CMR Cameroon 6 0.6 49.4% France FRA 
BFA Burkina Faso 9 0.5 86.3% Tunisia TUN 
NGA Nigeria 15 0.5 15.3% China* CHN 
UGA Uganda 9 0.5 31.1% United Kingdom* GBR 
COG Congo, Rep. 5 0.5 83.1% Mauritius* MUS 
ZWE Zimbabwe 15 0.5 13.1% France FRA 
MRT Mauritania 14 0.5 17.8% Senegal SEN 
RWA Rwanda 5 0.4 48.3% Singapore* SGP 
GAB Gabon 10 0.4 47.0% France FRA 
LSO Lesotho 3 0.4 44.2% United Kingdom* GBR 
GHA Ghana 11 0.4 22.6% Switzerland CHE 
COD Congo DRC 2 0.4 100.0% Belgium BEL 
MWI Malawi 5 0.4 31.6% Switzerland CHE 





Note 1: Aggressiveness measures presented in column (3) may be misleading for countries with less than three treaties (see 
column (2)). 
Note 2: Where N/A is shown on column (5), this indicates all of the African country’s treaties are homogeneous and no treaty 
partner appears as aggressive. 
(*) These countries provide complete relief from double taxation in the absence of a treaty (unilateral credit or exempt treatment 
for foreign-source dividends, interest and royalties). Cancelling or suspending the application of a treaty with these countries 
poses little or no risk of double taxation. 
  
CPV Cape Verde 3 0.3 62.5% Mauritius* MUS 
CIV Cote d'Ivoire 18 0.3 13.0% Tunisia TUN 
NER Niger 8 0.2 87.0% France FRA 
SLE Sierra Leone 3 0.2 80.0% United Kingdom* GBR 
TGO Togo 8 0.2 87.0% France FRA 
SOM Somalia 10   N/A  
AGO Angola 1   N/A  
CAF The Central African 
Republic 
3   N/A  
COM Comoros 1   N/A  
GNQ Equatorial Guinea 5   N/A  
LBR Liberia 1   N/A  
STP Sao Tome and 
Principe 
1   N/A  




3.4 Jurisdictions per region 
 
The list of jurisdictions in our sample per region is: 
• EU28: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
• China: China 
• USA: United States 
• GCC: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates 
• MUS/SYC: Mauritius, Seychelles 
• OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States 
• G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States 
• G20: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States 
• G24: Algeria, Brazil, China, Congo DRC, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, 
India, Iran, Kenya, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, South 
Africa, Syria 
• G77: Algeria, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, Congo DRC, Congo, Rep., Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, 
Vietnam, Yemen 
• Latam: Brazil, Chile, Mexico 








Figure A3.5 Foreign Direct Investment. Data: UNCTAD (World Investment Report, Annex 
tables 13 and 14) 
